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Bruce P. Archibald* The Significance of the Systemic Relative
Autonomy of Labour Law
The extent to which labour and employment law form an autonomous subsystem
within the legal order is a significant matter in labour relations scholarship.
Human capability theory helps explain how open legal constructs for structuring
personal work relations are emerging in a relatively autonomous manner Similarly
concepts of relational rights and relational contract theory assist in understanding
the relatively autonomous development of restorative labour market regulation,
with both substantive and procedural dimensions. Moreover dramatic changes
in freedom of association doctrine under the Charter, which now procedurally
protect collective bargaining, the right to strike and the independence of unions
from management, provide space for relatively autonomous regulation of the
unionized economic sector However there is far less constitutional protection
for substantive norms governing workplace relations. Nonetheless, the relative
autonomy of labour and employment law may constitute a barrier against illiberal,
populist distortion of labour market regulation.
La mesure dans laquelle le droit du travail forme un sous-systeme autonome
a l'intbrieur de I'ordre juridique est une question importante dans les 6tudes
en relations de travail. La thdorie de la capacit6 humaine aide a expliquer
I'6mergence de maniere relativement autonome de concepts juridiques ouverts
pour structurer les relations de travail. De mdme, les concepts de droits
relationnels et la thdorie des contrats relationnels nous aident a comprendre
le ddveloppement relativement autonome de la rdglementation restaurative du
march6 du travail et ses dimensions substantive et procddurale. De plus, des
modifications profondes au principe de la libert6 d'association sous le regime
de la Charte, qui protege aujourdhui efficacement, sur le plan procedural, la
ndgociation collective, le droit de greve et linddpendance des syndicats face aux
gestionnaires, crdent un espace pour la rdglementation relativement autonome
du secteur 6conomique syndiqu6. Toutefois, la protection constitutionnelle des
principes rdgissant la substance des relations en milieu de travail est beaucoup
moins forte. Ndanmoins, I'autonomie relative du droit du travail peut constituer un
obstacle a la distorsion populiste et attentatoire de la rdglementation du march6
du travail.
* Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. The author acknowledges the invaluable research
assistance and dedication of Macduy Ngo and William McLennan, Schulich School of Law, in the
preparation of this article, as well as the financial support of the Schulich Academic Excellence Fund,
Dalhousie University.
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Introduction
The idea of the autonomy of labour law as a regulatory sub-system within
the legal governance structures of western democracies has recently
received renewed interest.1 The debate over the autonomy of labour
law has to do with the degree to which the values, institutions and rules
which regulate activity in the workplace are, or should be, separate or
different from the general egal rules which govern other private or public
activities, particularly economic markets, in accordance with the rule of
law. The topic is both broadly theoretical and intensely practical, and it
engenders a wide range of views from observers in many jurisdictions.2
1. See Alan Bogg et al, eds, The Autonomy of Labour Law (London: Bloomsbury Publishing,
2015), which elaborates on ideas famously discussed by Lord Wedderburn, "Labour Law: From
Here to Autonomy" (1987) 16:1 Indus Rel LJ 1 and which was rooted in comparisons between then-
autonomous aspects of labour law in France as contrasted with Wedderbum's views on the situation
in the UK; Ruth Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The Enduring Idea ofLabour Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), asserts the potential theoretical and practical importance of a virtual "labour
constitution" in western democracies which was first identified by the Germanjurist Hugo Sinzheimer
during the Weimar Republic, and which represents a singular notion of the autonomy of labour law. Of
course, Otto Kahn-Freund, a former student of Sinzheimer, introduced to British labour law scholarship
the notion of collective laissez-faire, which captured significant aspects of autonomy prevalent in
UK labour relations and law in the immediate post-war period and beyond: see Mark Freedland,
"Otto Kahn-Freund, the Contract of Employment and the Autonomy of Labour Law" in Bogg et al,
supra. In North America, ideas related to the autonomy of labour law have been discussed under the
label "industrial pluralism": see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, "The Post-War Paradigm in American
Labor Law" (1981) 90:7 Yale LJ 1509 for the United States and Harry W Arthurs, "Understanding
Labour Law: The Debate Over 'Industrial Pluralism"' (1985) 38 Current Leg Probs 83 for Canada
(with its origins in his "Without the Law ": Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-
Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985)), though for Arthurs' most forceful
exposition of the autonomy of labour law, see his "Labour Law without the State?" (1996) 46:1
UTLJ 1. For a good overview of the theoretical synergies between British collective laissez-faire
and North American industrial pluralism, see Alan Bogg, The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union
Recognition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009). From a broader sociological approach, the autonomy of
labour law can be seen as an example of legal sub-system autopoiesis: see Niklas Luhmann, Law as
a Social System, translated by Klaus A Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and from a
still broader theoretical perspective, the autonomy of labour law is arguably the embodiment of "law
as a category of social mediation between facts and norms" embedded in a communicative theory of
action: see JilrgenHabermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory ofLaw
and Democracy, translated by William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), especially Chapters 1
through 4. For a recent analysis of this European theoretical literature in relationto labour law, see Ralf
Rogowski, Reflexive Labour Law in the World Society (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing,
2013). It is beyond the scope of this paper to make explicit links between its observations on the
relative autonomy of Canadian labour and employment law and the foregoing theoretical literature,
but it is hoped that he Canadian legal phenomena identified herein may facilitate that exercise in the
future.
2. See Mark Freedland & Jeremias Prassl, eds, iking, Laval and Beyond: EU Law in the Member
States (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), which provides an important example of working through
questions of autonomy and interdependence of labour market and general economic regulation in the
context of analysing the relationship between the European Union internal economic market and the
domestic labour market regulation of its member states-an exacting and rare exercise in comparative
law, which reveals multiple points of view on the issues.
4 The Dalhousie Law Journal
In this context, I would assert hat Canadian labour law is characterized
by considerable autonomy, and that this autonomy provides opportunities
for significant experimentation with various approaches to the regulation
of individual work relationships, collective labour relations and labour
markets at large. However, this autonomy is relative in the sense that it is
bound by overarching legal, political and economic constraints, some of
which are appropriate and others of which ought to be relaxed.
There are several structural dimensions which have historically given
rise to this Canadian phenomenon ofrelatively autonomous labour law. First,
the Canadian constitution has decentralized legislative and governmental
authority over labour law, giving primary jurisdiction to the provinces, and
only residual jurisdiction to the federal government o regulate labour law
in the core sense.3 Secondly, substantive and procedural rules governing
the law of the workplace are scattered among the common law,4 labour
standards codes (governing the non-unionized private sector), and labour
relations statutes (governing unionized labour relations),6 to say nothing of
the legislation covering unionized and non-union employees in the public
3. This is not the place to engage in a detailed discussion of Canadian Constitutional law as it
applies to labour and employment law topics: see Part II, infra, for discussion on some aspects of
this topic. Suffice it to say that the words "labour law" or "employment law" appear nowhere in
the Constitution Act, 1867, infra note 142, which lays out the legislative authority of Parliament as
opposed to provincial legislatures. Judicial interpretation largely imposed on the Canadian polity in
the 1920s by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (UK), as Canada's then-highest court of
appeal, awarded primary authority over labour relations as a matter of "property and civil rights"
to the provinces, and by implication left the federal government to legislate matters of labour and
employment law in only those areas of economic activity over which it has specific authority: Toronto
Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] AC 396, 2 DLR 5 (PC). This is very different from the
United States, where the interstate commerce clause was used to justify federal primacy over the
regulation of labour and employment relations in the private sector. See Harry Arthurs, "Labour and
the 'Real' Constitution" (2007) 48 C de D 43 [Arthurs, "Constitution"] and Brian Langille, "Who
Governs Labour Market Policy in Canada?" (2009) 71 Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations 245
[Langille, "Who Governs"]; see discussion below in Part III of this paper which presents some further
reflections upon the Canadian constitution and economic and labour market regulation. This may,
however, be an appropriate place to note that throughout this article, I will, in accordance with global
practice, use the label "labour law" to refer to the legal rules which govern the workplace whether
their source be in the common law, legislation, or constitutional documents, and whether these rules
apply to sectors where collective bargaining is in place or where individual contracts of employment
predominate. However, since the focus here is on the situation in Canada, I will be forced from time to
time to revert to the North American convention of using "labour law" to apply to the rules surrounding
collective bargaining and "employment law" to apply to non-unionized labour relations rules.
4. Geoffrey England, Individual Employment Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 49-102.
5. Stacey R Ball, Canadian Employment Law (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2010) (loose-leaf
release 65, 2016), ch21.
6. George W Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2nd ed (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1993) (loose-leaf
revision 58, 2016), ch 2 [Adams, Canadian Labour Law].
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sector.' Some might add international law to this list. This plurality of
sources adds both legal "wiggle-room" and heterogeneity to the system.
Thirdly, though Canadian courts of general jurisdiction dominate the
common law,9 specialized labour tribunals apply the regimes covered by
labour and employment law statutes,0 in addition to occupational health and
safety rules,1 workers' compensation regulations, and the like.1 2 Recently,
the courts, through administrative law, have given increasing deference to
labour tribunals in the exercise of their statutory mandates, and to labour
arbitrators handling grievances under collective agreements.1 3 In addition,
these labour boards and arbitration panels have received the authority to
apply constitutional law, human rights provisions, general statutes and
even common law principles applicable to the workplace in the course of
adjudicating disputes arising out of conduct at work.4 Indeed, courts of
general jurisdiction have begun reciprocally to adopt the "jurisprudence"
of these labour adjudicators in the elaboration of the common law or in
statutory and indeed constitutional interpretation. Fourthly, collective
agreements, in the American-style, plant-level bargaining adopted in each
Canadian jurisdiction, as well as frequently broader agreements in the
7. Allen Ponak & Mark Thompson, "Public Sector Collective Bargaining" in Morley Gunderson,
Allen Ponak & Daphne Gottlieb, eds, Union Management Relations in Canada (Toronto: Addison
Wesley Longman, 2001) 414. Labour rights in the public sector do not have the same historical origins,
nor the same modem challenges, as those in the private sector. In their dual role as employer and
legislator, and subject to their own needs and interests, governments of varying levels and jurisdictions
have developed differing approaches. Generally speaking, there are at least three important distinctions
between legislation in the public sector and that in the private sector: (1) there is less discretion for
labour boards in certification and recognition of public sector bargaining units; (2) there is a tendency
to restrict the scope of bargaining for public sector bargaining units; (3) there are different, and often
more restricted, dispute resolution procedures available to public sector bargaining units. Importantly,
the differences have been challenged in recent years with the Supreme Court of Canada's latest rulings
on s 2(d) of the Charter ofRights and Freedoms, infra note 18. For a more detailed iscussion on these
changes see Part III, infra.
8. See for example the role of Canada's international obligations in Health Services and Support-
Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 [BC
Health].
9. Donald D Carter et al, Labour Law in Canada (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) at
62-70.
10. Ibid.
11. Ball, supra note 5, ch 30 at 1-20.
12. England, supra note 4 at 199-203.
13. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir].
14. Weber v Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 SCR 929, [1995] SCJ No 59 (QL) [Weber]; Parry Sound
(District) Social Services Administration Board v Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU),
Local 324, 2003 SCC 42, [2003] 2 SCR 157 [Parry Sound].
15. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30v Irving Pulp & Paper,
Ltd, 2013 SCC 34, [2013] 2 SCR 458. In respect to the expansion of common law remedies with
deference to labour arbitrators, see Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba Association of
Health Care Professionals, 2011 SCC 59, [2011] 3 SCR 616.
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public sector,16 create loci of "law-making" authority which give rise to a
certain amount of locally autonomous regulatory variation." Fifthly, while
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies only to state action,
both federal and provincial, a very activist Supreme Court of Canada has
led the way in asserting that the common law ought, where appropriate, to
be infused with "Charter values," and this has lent a degree of suppleness
to the evolution of the common law in Canada." Finally, unlike the United
States, where there are separate federal and state judicial hierarchies, the
Supreme Court of Canada is at the apex of a unified court system, which
applies both federal and provincial laws.19 In terms of autonomy, this
unified system of appellate review can cut both ways. The upshot of these
parallel and interlocking institutional dimensions of labour law is that it
is both relatively autonomous and varied, even if it is regularly subjected
to constitutional and administrative law review proceedings in the general
courts. The system is one of reciprocity, where relatively autonomous
labour law, rooted in common law, statutory and constitutional sources, is
being both influenced by and contributing to the evolution of the general
legal system. There are fourteen Canadianjurisdictions (federal, provincial
and territorial) working out the details of labour law within this relative
autonomy, along often similar, yet sometimes divergent, paths. However,
given the constitutional and administrative review jurisdiction exercised
by the general courts, one might be tempted to draw certain parallels
between the Canadian situation and some visions of the European Union's
"open method of coordination."2 0
16. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, supra note 6, ch I at 11-16.
17. This is very different from the sort of national and sector bargaining which one finds in Europe:
see Roy Adams, Industrial Relations under Liberal Democracy: North America in Comparative
Perspective (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995). In this respect he NorthAmerican
system of labour relations is an international outlier.
18. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. See, e.g., Potter v New Brunswick Legal Aid
Services Commission, 2015 SCC 10, [2015] 1 SCR 500 [Potter]; Pepsi-Cola Beverages (West) Ltdv
REDSU, Local 558, 2002 SCC 8, [2002] 1 SCR 156; Hillv Church ofScientology ofToronto, [1995] 2
SCR 1130, 126 DLR (4th) 129; see Dagenais v Canada Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835 at 911-
912, 120 DLR (4th) 12 for a general discussion on the early application of the Charter to the common
law.
19. Janet Walker& Lorne Sossin, Civil Litigation (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 7-16.
20. Roger Blanpain, European LabourLaw, 12th ed (Alphen aan denRijn: Kluwer Law International,
2010) at 29-33; Manfred Weiss, "Industrial Relations and EU Enlargement" in John DR Craig &
Michael Lynk, eds, Globalization and the Future ofLabour Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006) 169.
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The current tensions associated with globalization,2 1 the new
economy,2 continuing revolutions in communications and productive
technologies,2 3 the collapse of the welfare state,2 4 the decline of reliance
on collective labour relations,2 5 the rise of precarious employment in the
"fissured workplace"2 6 and the growing chasms of economic and social
inequality2 7 are all being played out in Canada in the context of the above-
described relatively autonomous system of labour law. Canadian labour
law is caught up in this web of increasingly familiar, interconnected
problems, which have created an intellectual crisis concerning the purpose
and the role of labour law, its values and its institutions.28 But the relative
autonomy, or perhaps the multiple relative autonomies, of Canadian labour
law have forced open interesting new juridical spaces for experimentation.
I wish to explore Canadian developments in relation to what I consider
to be the three most important sets of interrelated legal themes arising
out of the regulatory morass in which global labour markets, including
those of Canada, find themselves. The first area is to link theories of
human capability development, as an overarching justificatory narrative
for labour law, with the idea of personal work relations, as the central
analytical foundation on which to build work-related legal entitlements
and obligations, by contrast to the standard contract of employment. The
second area is to apply concepts of relational rights, and particularly
relational contract theory, to the emerging legal category of contracts
21. Bruce C N Greenwald & Judd Kahn, Globalization: n. the irrationalfear that someone in China
will take your job (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2009).
22. Doug Henwood, After the New Economy (New York: The New Press, 2003).
23. David S Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development
in Western Europe from 1750 to Present, 2d ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
24. Rosalie Chappell, Social Welfare in Canadian Society, 4thed (Toronto: Nelson, 2009) at 88-112.
25. Judy Fudge, "The New Workplace: Surveying the Landscape" (2009) 33 Man LJ 131.
26. Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (New York: Bloomsbury Academic,
2011); a recent report finds that 44% of workers in the greater Toronto area and Hamilton (combined),
which represents the industrial heartland of a de-industrializing Province of Ontario, find themselves
in precarious employment of one sort or another: Wayne Lewchuk et al, The Precarity Penalty: The
Impact of Employment Precarity on Individuals, Households and Communities-and What to Do
About It, (Hamilton: Poverty and Employment Precarity in Southern Ontario, 2015), online: <pepso.
ca> [Precarity Penalty]. For an excellent discussion on the notion of the precariat under the expanded
concept of the fissured workplace see David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad
for So Many and What Can Be Done to Improve It (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).
27. Chrystia Freeland, Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall ofEveryone
Else (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2012); Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century,
translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014);
Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2016).
28. Brian Langille, "Labour Law's Theory of Justice" [Langille, "Labour Law"] in Guy Davidov
& Brian Langille, eds, The Idea of Labour Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 101
[Davidov & Langille, Idea].
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for personal work in order to elaborate the basis for what can be called
restorative labour market regulation. The third area is to look at evolving
Canadian constitutional values and norms to see how they impact upon
or condition the relatively autonomous values, norms and institutions of
labour law. These three themes structure the three main parts of this paper.
In all these areas, there are common law, statutory labour law regimes and
constitutional developments bubbling up in the interstices of the Canadian
labour law system. By highlighting the experience of certain Canadian
institutions and actors in relation to these three themes, one can explore
both the potential and the limits of labour law's relative autonomy.
I. Human capability development and open legal constructs for
personal work relations
Human capability development theory in various guises is gaining traction
as a normative framework, embedded in an empirically supported view
of reality, which can provide a justificatory narrative for fair and efficient
labour law. However, the connection of human capability development to
labour market regulation arguably requires an open and flexible approach
to the legal construction of personal work relations which goes beyond
the standard employment contract-the traditional foundation upon which
labour law has been based in the post-WWII era. Making the theoretical
link between these lines of thought, illustrating their potential for practical
implementation, and using some positive and negative examples which
have emerged from the relatively autonomous sphere of Canadian labour
law are the aims of this section of the paper.
1. Human capability development theory and the foundations of labour
law
Amartya Sen argues convincingly that the development of human
capabilities makes freedom possible.29 Freedom is defined as the
situation where people have capabilities (personal abilities and contextual
opportunities) to choose to "lead the lives they have reason to value."30
He identifies five instrumental freedoms enhancing personal capabilities
and functionings: (1) political freedoms, including freedom of association
and expression, as well as democratic institutions; (2) economic facilities,
including a reliable legal system, functioning markets, and access to credit;
(3) social opportunities, including education, health care, and employment
possibilities; (4) transparency guarantees, including overnment openness
and integrity, and political trust; and (5) protective security, including
29. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 3-11.
30. Ibid at 293.
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unemployment benefits, social and old age security.3 1 These instrumental
sources of freedom clearly have relevance to discourses aimed at ensuring
balanced political, legal, social and economic conditions in democracies,
writ large.32 However, the point here is to see how these notions relate
specifically to labour law and labour market regulation. A considerable
and valuable literature is evolving on this question. Brian Langille's views
are perhaps the most expansive. He argues that the protective rationale
for labour law, which encourages both the view that substantive and
procedural rules improving working conditions constitute a cost or a tax
on production, and promoting the race to the bottom in global regulatory
terms, should be abandoned in favour of a rationale which accepts that
the development of human capabilities should be at the conceptual core
of labour law.3 3 So conceived, Langille sees development of human
capabilities as an investment in the most essential aspects of a productive
and competitive economy, while more importantly being at its core a
theory ofjustice for labour law and labour regulation.3 4 The more narrowly
focused view of Simon Deakin, in some measure, builds capability theory
upward from capacity as a legal concept basic to contracts of employment
which are the foundation of labour market.3 5 However, Deakin and his
collaborators3 6 see labour and employment law standards not necessarily
as a constraint on competitive economic development, but rather as
"providing solutions to coordination problems arising from the presence
of transaction costs and externalities, which would otherwise tend to
limit the scope of markets."3 7 There is North American corroboration
for this latter view in the conclusions of Kevin Banks. Banks argues that
31. Ibidat38-40.
32. See generally Martha C Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).
33. Brian Langille, "Labour Policy in Canada: New Platform, New Paradigm" (2002) 28:1 Can Pub
Pol'y 133 [Langille, "Labour Policy"].
34. Langille, "Labour Law," supra note 28.
35. Simon Deakin, "Capacitas: Contract Law, Capabilities, and the Legal Foundation of the Market,"
in Simon Deakin and Alain Supiot, eds, Capacitas: Contract Law and the Institutional Preconditions
ofa Market Economy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 1.
36. Simon Deakin& Frank Wilkinson, The Law ofthe Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment
and Legal Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
37. Simon Deakin, "The Contribution of Labour Law to Economic and Human Development"
in Davidov & Langille, Idea, supra note 28, 156 at 162 [Deakin, "Contribution of Labour"]. This
view challenges the notion that more fulsome labour standards protecting workers is at odds with
competitive economic development and leads to a "race to the bottom" among different jurisdictions.
This "race to the bottom" phenomenon is sometimes referred to with reference to environmental and
labour market regulation. See, e.g., Ronald B Davies & Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, "A Race to
the Bottom in Labor Standards? An Empirical Investigation" (2013) 103 J Development Economics 1;
but see also Bob Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005).
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Canada need not adjust its workplace law to compete with the apparent
internal U.S. race to the bottom among its states, because the regulatory
environment in which Canadian labour and employment laws operate
provides competitive advantages not available in the United States, at least
when properly designed.3 8
Capability theory leads inexorably to the conclusion that an adequate
analysis of labour law and its potential for enhancing human capability must
occur within a contextual, comprehensive and integrated understanding of
labour market regulation.3 9 But legal thinking about labour and employment
regulation in common law Canada has, since the advent of modem labour
in the aftermath of World War II, been dominated by a conceptual focus
on the standard employment contract as the legal platform upon which
labour and employment obligations and benefits are built.40 While the
Canadian common law relating to the regulation of work relations was,
and to a great extent still is, biased toward hirers of labour rooted in the
English law of master and servant," the post-war collective bargaining
regimes and labour standards codes for non-unionized workers, based on
the "protective rationale" and intended to right the power imbalance, were
explicitly articulated in terms of the language of the relationship between
"employers" and "employees." However, these terms were legislatively
defined in an entirely circular manner, which led labour and employment
tribunals and courts alike to rely initially for their interpretation on the
common law distinction between contracts of service (employment) and
contracts for services (commercial purchases of services from independent
contractors).4 2 Moreover, the working assumption, and the broad empirical
reality, during the three decades following WW II, was that the norm
for employment relations was full-time, or at least regular part-time,
employment in both the unionized and non-unionized sectors.4 3
38. Kevin Banks, "Must Canada Change Its Labour and Employment Laws to Compete with the
United States?"(2013) 38:2 Queen's LJ 419.
39. For a critique of this labour market analysis see Dukes, supra note 1.
40. Langille, "Labour Policy," supra note 33.
41. England, supra note 4 at 49-102.
42. Brian A Langille & Guy Davidov, "Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View
from Canada" (1999) 21:1 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 7 [Langille & Davidov, "Beyond Employees"];
Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, "Employee or Independent Contractor? Charting the Legal
Significance of the Distinction in Canada" (2003) 10 CLELJ 193.
43. There was, of course, a gendered dimension to this in the years after WW II where explicit
labour market policies were dedicated to returning women to domestic labour from the industrial
employment that many had during the war, and ensuring a family income to be provided by the male
"family bread winner": see Judy Fudge, "Self-Employment, Women and Precarious Work: The Scope
of Labour Protection" in Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens, eds, Precarious Work, Women and the
New Economy: The Challenge to Legal Norms (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006) 201. The "family
allowance," paid to mothers by the federal government and calculated on a per child basis, was a key
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Of course, the demographics of the labour market have been totally
altered in the last three to four decades. Many employers, particularly in
the non-union sector, have been unable to resist the temptation to reduce
labour costs by dividing available work among part-time and casual
employees to whom they are not required to pay the full range of benefits
under labour standards legislation.4 Employers with strong bargaining
power in the unionized sector have been able resist the efforts of unions
to prevent the contracting out of jobs through collective bargaining."
Moreover, some employers regularly label regular workers as independent
contractors rather than employees in order to avoid payment of benefits and
also avoid the inconvenience of the alternative strategy of "casualization"
of their work force, which along with contracting out and other methods by
employers has led to the segmentation, or "fissuring," of the workplace.4 6
This segmentation of the labour force has currently reached a calamitous
crescendo in Canada where a huge percentage of the labour force, and
particularly among vulnerable groups such as youth, women, people
of colour, and both legal and illegal immigrants, are engaged in such
precarious employment."
Such labour market segmentation, founded upon the distortion of the
standard contract of employment, in an economy oriented to shareholder
primacy rather than stakeholder (including employees) balance, is the
element in this strategy.
44. Geoffrey England, Part-time, Casual and Other Atypical Workers: A Legal Vlew, Research and
Current Issues Series No 48 (Kingston: IRC Press, 1987); Harry Arthurs, Fairness at Work: Labour
Standards for the 21st Century (Ottawa: Federal Labour Standards Review, 2006) at 109-110 [Arthurs
Report].
45. Whether contracting out was a standard right in the hands of management, which could be
exercised unless prohibited by the collective agreement, was once a contested issue among Canadian
arbitrators. However, in a comprehensive decision reviewing the arbitral jurisprudence, Harry Arthurs,
then a young arbitrator, sealed the death warrant on arguments that contracting out was presumptively
not a management right unless bargained for, and set the tone for a dominant jurisprudence which put
employers in a privileged position on the issue: Re United Steelworkers ofAmerica and Russel Steel
Ltd (1966), 17 LAC 253 (OLRB).
46. This problem of disguised employment seems to be distributed throughout a wide income
spectrum, and is not confined to stereotypical vulnerable employees: see Weil, supra note 26. Works
of this sort, of course, tend to emphasize official reports and statistics which may underrepresent the
problems of the phenomenon connected to the underground or informal economy.
47. Leah F Vosko, ed, Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006); Law Commission of Ontario,
Vulnerable Workers and Precarious Work (Toronto: December 2012), online: <lco-cdo.org> [LCO
Report]. In response to these growing concerns the Liberal Government of Ontario commissioned
Special Advisors C Michael Mitchell and John C Murray to conduct the Ontario Changing Workplaces
Review which reported on 23 May 2017, and which was promptly followed on June I with draft
legislation from the Government intended to implement some aspects of the Report: Ontario Ministry
of Labour, News Release, "Ontario Introduces Legislation to Create Fair Workplaces, Better Jobs"
(1 June 2017), online: <news.Ontario.ca>.
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antithesis of a contextual, comprehensive and integrated approach to
labour market regulation. This is true regardless of the justifications
advanced for labour law. One might expect better from the implementation
of the protective rationale of labour standards, or a human rights rationale
based on principles of equality, to say nothing of the obvious negation
of labour and employment law founded upon the development of human
capability." In response to this situation, which of course is paralleled in
many western, high-wage economies, there is a search for a new way to
conceptualize the legal regulation of personal work relations which is not
governed by what have turned out to be the dysfunctional manipulations
of the standard contract of employment in relation to other forms of hiring
labour services.49
2. Regulation ofpersonal work relations through capability-related
open legal constructs
The most promising analysis of the suppression of capability development
through labour market segmentation, based on manipulation or avoidance
of the standard employment contract through other exploitative work
arrangements, is presented in the work of Mark Freedland and Nicola
Kountouris.o They set about the task of providing a conceptual basis
for the reform of this situation through the elaboration of a concept of
the "personal work relation." This they define as: "an engagement [or]
arrangement ... for the carrying out of work or the rendering of a service
... by the worker personally."1 The purpose of the definition is to "break
the bounds of the contract of employment... to extend [labour rights and
related benefits] to 'personal work', rather than 'employment' ... "52 In
addition to full- or regular part-time employees in standard employment
contracts, other work arrangements which might be regulated under the
rubric of personal work relations could include self-employed or own-
account in/dependent contractors, public office holders, ministers of
religion, charity or volunteer workers, liberal professionals, company
48. Brian Langille, "'Take these Chains from my Heart and Set me Free': How Labour Law Theory
Drives Segmentation of Workers' Rights" (2015) 36:2 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 257 [Langille, "Chains"],
which underscores the value of human capability theory.
49. See Paul Davies & Mark Freedland, Towards a Flexible Labour Market (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007); and Weil, supra note 26.
50. Mark Freedland & Nicola Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). This is a sophisticated text that employs a comparative
methodology and provides empirical examples of how personal work relations are variously treated in
the UK and continental European legal systems.
51. Freedland & Kountouris, ibid at 22 [emphasis added].
52. Ibid at 31. For a discussion of some of these situations in the Canadian context see Ball, supra
note 5.
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managers, workers for employment agencies, casual workers, trainees
or apprentices, employment interns,5 individual franchisees, and certain
bailees.4 The idea is to focus on the relations between those who hire
workers to do work personally and those who do the work, in order to
determine whether they should receive parallel treatment in terms of
labour and employment law regulation.
This question of whether a broader category of personal workers than
those in standard employment contracts should be similarly governed by
labour law must be answered by reference to the purpose one attributes
to the particular labour regulation at issue and the circumstances of the
hiring arrangement. The protective rationale for labour law-namely, that
there must be rules to protect the vulnerable-would seem to apply to
individuals doing the same work in similar circumstances whether they are
hired or labelled as employees or in/dependent contractors. Similarly, if
fundamental or human rights protection is seen as the dominant rationale
for labour law then it is hard to justify inequality or discrimination based
on whether one is employed under a standard employment contract or
some other arrangement if one is personally doing the same work as others
in the same way. Finally, if one sees human capability development as the
underlying basis for labour laws and regulations, why should rights to
pensions, parental leave entitlements, educational leave opportunities and
the like be differently distributed in accordance with whether one is in a
standard employment contract or some other hiring arrangement? There
is a massive socio-legal dysfunction in this failure to address the problem
of labour segmentation through the lens of how the law may arbitrarily
construct personal work relations. This leads to pervasive problems of
precarity and systematic barriers to the development of human capabilities
on a huge scale. How these purposive insights about the legal construction
of personal work relations can be employed to improve the situation is
a matter which depends on the particular contexts of the socio-legal,
economic, political and cultural circumstances ofjurisdictions where such
an effort might be undertaken.
Hugh Collins has recently re-asserted his view that the crucial
problem for the Freedland/Kountouris concept of the personal work
relation is that "it is not a legal concept" and that "it is not possible to
organize a legal subject around a legal institution or a legal concept that
53. Freedland & Kountouris, supra note 50 at 42, 348, 356.
54. The latter two examples are drawn from protective legislation in Australia: Richard Johnstone
et al, Beyond Employment: The Legal Regulation of Work Relationships (Sydney: Federation Press,
2012) at 47-76.
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does not exist."5 Clearly, the personal work relation is not a recognized
nominate contract at common law or a precise definition given legal
effect by statute.56 However, with all due respect, one may argue that
the personal work relation is indeed a legal concept which is helpful for
organizing and thinking about the interpretation and application of labour
law rules, in much the same way that the notion of fault or mens rea in
criminal law, or negligence in the law of torts, assist in organizing and
giving content to doctrinal rules and applying them in individual cases.
In the Canadian context, the concept of the personal work relation has
powerful explanatory value in demonstrating the in/coherence of certain
legislative policy choices, common law decisions and, perhaps most
importantly, approaches to statutory interpretation in labour law matters.
Canadian methods of statutory interpretation are particularly significant
in this regard. The Supreme Court of Canada has abandoned a narrow,
common law "mischief rule" orientation to statutory interpretation,57
and has enjoined the lower courts and administrative tribunals to adopt a
"purposive approach" to this adjudicative activity. The words of an act are
to be "read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary
sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and
the intention of the [legislature in question]."58 This is consistent with
Interpretation Acts in virtually all Canadian jurisdictions which provide
that every act "shall be deemed to be remedial" and direct that every act
shall "receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation
as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to
its true intent, meaning and spirit." These injunctions, along with the
preambles to certain Canadian labour and employment statutes59 and
55. Hugh Collins, "Contractual Autonomy" in Bogg et al, eds, The Autonomy ofLabour Law, supra
note 1 at 71. It does seem odd to hear this static view of legal rules from the pen of ajurist of Collins's
sophistication and stature.
56. Although statutes which use the label "worker" rather than "employee" as the basis for allocating
protections or benefits may come closest to doing this. See, e.g., occupational health and safety statutes
in Canada, which cast the net even more broadly than personal workers to include owners, etc. See
also the EqualityAct 2010 (UK), c 15.
57. John Willis, "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938) 16:1 Can Bar Rev 1.
58. Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, [1998] 1 SCR 27, 154 DLR (4th) 193 at para 21, citing Elmer
Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87. This approach is also
being advocated in a comparative context for its value in helping to resolve various interpretive issues
in the field; see Guy Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2016).
59. The preambles to both the Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2 and the Nova Scotia Trade
Union Act, RSNS 1989, c 475, for example, state the purpose of labour relations as the promotion
of "the common well-being" of citizens through "the encouragement of free collective bargaining
and the constructive settlement of disputes," the recognition of "freedom of association and free
collective bargaining" as the bases of "effective industrial relations" and "good working conditions,"
and the support of "labour and management in their cooperative efforts to develop good relations
and constructive collective bargaining practices" for the benefit of all. The implications of this broad
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Supreme Court encouragement to infuse the interpretation exercise with
"Charter values" where appropriate, allow for considerable creativity in
adjusting statutory words to evolving legal needs.6 0 Canadian statutory
interpretation is far from the venerable teleological or "free scientific
research" orientations of certain European civilian jurisdictions,1 but it
would seem equally distant from mechanical variants of "originalism"
in some American jurisdictions.6 2 In other words, in dealing with such
questions as who falls within the definition of an "employee" or who is
an "employer," who is a "casual" employee, or who is an in/dependent
contractor, for the purposes of labour statutes, Canadian adjudicators are
not bound by the dead hand of ancient common law definitions, but must
seek an interpretation appropriate to the Act and the circumstances to
which it must be applied. The concept of the personal work relation is a
useful tool in this exercise. The purpose of the next section is to show how
this "autonomy-encouraging" legal environment has, or can, create space
for a labour law which enhances human capability development.
3. Relatively autonomous labour law and Canadian responses to labour
market segmentation
There are interrelated issues, around contracting out (now called "out-
sourcing"), casual employment, and industry-specific forms of non-
standard employment, that illustrate differing Canadian legislative and
adjudicative responses to issues of labour market segmentation.6 3 Some
of the decisions considered below could have been different if they had
benefited from analysis based on the concept of personal work relations
connected to a human capability development rationale for employment
wording in the Nova Scotia context were discussed by the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board in Egg
Films, infra note 84 at paras 43-48, and applied in that same case, as discussed below.
60. Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2014).
See also Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser], as well as the
jurisprudence, supra note 18.
61. Frangois Geny, Methode d'interpretation et sources en droitprivepositif 2d ed (Paris: Librairie
generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1954); see also Louis Josserand, Les mobiles dans les actes
juridiques du droitprive (Paris: Dalloz, 1928).
62. Miguel Schor, "Contextualizing the Debate Between Originalism and the Living Constitution"
(2011) 59 Drake L Rev 961. American Originalism finds perhaps its most famous support in the work
of the late Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court of the United States. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia,
"Originalism: The Lesser Evil" (1989) 57:3 U Cin L Rev 849; Antonin Scalia, "Common-Law Courts
in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution
and Laws" in A Matter of Interpretation, Amy Gutman, ed (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1997); Antonin Scalia, "Constitutional Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way" (remarks delivered at
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, 14 March 2005), online:
<www.bc.edu>.
63. On the general problem, see Simon Deakin, "Addressing Labour Market Segmentation: The
Role of Labour Law" (2013) International Labour Organization Working Paper No 52.
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standards or collective labour relations. Others demonstrate concern for
the issues raised by the conceptual shift to an understanding of the legal
construction of personal work relations, and reach solutions consistent
with the thrust of a personal work relations approach, regardless of the
underlying theory justifying the particular instance of labour regulation.
In at least one case, there is an explicit recognition of the personal work
relations approach as an aspect of the solution adopted. However, a
point of clarification may be in order before turning to the specifics of
the examples. There is no serious dispute in Canada that small business,
and indeed own-account self-employment, is an important and legitimate
economic activity. There is no serious dispute that many individuals may
wish to earn a living by running their own businesses, whether as a sole-
proprietorship or as an incorporated entity, where the principal may be the
only worker or service provider. There is no dispute that these operations
may be governed by the general rules of commercial contracts, regulations
to ensure fair competition in commerce and, where appropriate, the
application of particular tax regimes for businesses, etc. However, there are
disputes over circumstances where persons engaged in providing goods or
services personally are perceived to be involved in disguised employment,
and are thought to be denied the benefits or entitlements which would flow
from employment status, were it properly recognized.64
During the Great Depression, there emerged a Canadian common
law decision which can still be projected today onto the concept of the
personal work relation. In 1936, the Ontario Court of Appeal was asked to
decide whether a commission sales arrangement of an indefinite term was
a master and servant relationship (with a right to notice of termination,
normally of six months) or a commercial contract between principal and
agent (which could be terminated at will). 65 The court held it was neither,
saying:
There are many cases of an intennediate nature where the relationship of
master and servant does not exist, but where an agreement to terminate
the arangement upon reasonable notice may be implied. This, I think, is
such a case. The mode of remuneration points to mercantile agency pure
and simple, but the duties indicate a relationship of a more pernanent
character. The choice of sub-agents andtheirtraining, the recommendation
of them to the company for appointment, the supervision of these men
64. See Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, supra note 42. The broader economic context for these phenomena
is the fissured workplace, in which companies maintain market share and brand loyalty by spinning-
off core functions through the mechanisms of contracting out, franchises, or the use of employment
agencies, seeking to keep their workforce competitive: see Weil, supra note 26.
65. Carter v Bell and Sons (Canada) Ltd, [19361 OR 290 at 295, 2 DLR 438 (CA) [Carter].
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when appointed, all point to this more permanent relationship. The fact
that the plaintiff was entering a new territory as representative of the
defendant and was endeavouring to create a market for the defendant's
products and that to their knowledge he was taking his wife and children
with him to the West indicate a relationship that could not be terminated
at will by either party.
This arrangement of an "intermediate nature," being neither a master and
servant relationship nor a standard commercial agency deal, can be seen as
an early prototype of the legal concept of the personal work relation. The
court's reading of the implied obligation ofthe duty to give notice bespeaks
a concern for the relational nature of the arrangement and the vulnerability
of the plaintiff-both are significant in connection with capability theory
and the legal construction of personal work relations.
A common example of labour market segmentation through disguised
employment, from the 1970s to the present, has occurred in relation to
transportation services in various industries in different parts of Canada.
Instead of contracting out to independent trucking firms, some employers
even created arrangements whereby they leased or sold their vehicles to
"former employees" and reimbursed them on a fee for service basis as
".contractors" rather than providing wages and benefits to "employees."6 6
These arrangements usually down-load costs to the drivers, while
prohibiting them from working for other customers to enhance their
".profits." These vulnerable workers were recognized as being victims
of disguised employment, and were labelled dependent rather than
independent contractors, who thus warranted the protections of access
to collective bargaining.6 7 Some labour relations tribunals and courts
were unwilling to go behind the fagade of the "commercial" contractual
arrangements to provide a remedy.6 8 Several jurisdictions therefore
amended their collective bargaining legislation to assimilate such
dependent contractors to the status of employees in order to allow them
to unionize.69 Tribunals in other jurisdictions simply achieved the same
66. Langille & Davidov, supra note 42 at 22-23.
67. Ibid at 23-25. Taxi drivers have also been found to fall within the dependent contractor category
and assimilated to the status of employee for purposes of employment standards act protections: see
Imperial Taxi Brandon (1983) Ltd v Hutchison (1987), 46 DLR (4th) 310, 50 Man R (2d) 81 (Man
CA). Compare Nash et Green Crescent Holdings Limited, 2013 NSLB 141, Eric K Slone, Alternative
Chair. It is of interest to note that the illegal operation of taxis by the complainant affected the board's
decision in the latter case.
68. Langille & Davidov, supra note 42 at 26.
69. Ibidat25-27. See, e.g., LabourRelationsAct, SO 1995, c 1, ScheduleA, s 1(1); Labour Relations
Code, RSBC 1996, c 244, s 28; Canada Labour Code, supra note 59, s 3(1). Some commentators
argued that recognition of dependent contractors at common law by labour boards preceded the
legislation and adoption of the term in the 1970s, and as such the latter was unnecessary (at the
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result be interpreting the statutory words "employee" and "employer" in a
purposive and expansive manner to rectify the problem." The protective
rationale for labour and employment regulation was invoked regularly
to justify such ends. The concept of the "personal work relation" had
certainly not been invented at the time, but the truck drivers, divested of
their employment benefits, were doing the same work they had carried
out previously. The legal construction of their personal work relations
had changed, usually not in accordance with the workers' desires or
interests. In a recent case, an Alberta judge found that a couple running a
small trucking company together, doing deliveries for 16 years on behalf
of Woolworth Canada (bought out by Wal-Mart), were involved in an
"intermediate category" closer to a contract of employment than to an
independent contractor arrangement." The court awarded the plaintiffs
substantial damages in lieu of nine months' notice of termination of the
contract. In doing so, it relied, among other legal sources, upon Carter,
principles from collective bargaining legislation, and the scholarship of
Judy Fudge.72 The implications for human capacity development in these
circumstances might be analyzed in different ways. Be that as it may, the
foregoing situations demonstrate how a relatively autonomous system of
labour relations is able to respond to what one might now see as problems
of attempted labour market segmentation, and to resolve them by what
seems to be the "intermediate concept of the personal work relation."
"Casualization" of employment over the last few decades has been
seen in Canada as an increasing problem which is closely linked to the
scourge of precarity.73 But episodic legal arrangements for performance
of work on a short-term basis have been with us for centuries, though
time): see Michael Bendel, "The Dependent Contractor: An Unnecessary and Flawed Development in
Canadian Labour Law" (1982) 32:4 UTLJ 374.
70. In Nova Scotia, for example, see Retail Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 1015
and Sobeyk Stores Limited (Warehouse) (10 May 1976), No 2276 (NSLRB) (where truckers who
owned their own trucks in a "broker" arrangement were held to be employees and not independent
contractors); and Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco Workers International Union, Local 446 and
Baxter Foods Limited (7 February 1996), No 4321 (NSLRB) (where truck drivers and largely self-
directing merchandizers were deemed employees rather than independent contractors). Those cases
considered Part I of the Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, supra note 59, but similar issues have arisen in
the construction industry underPart II oftheAct: see United Brotherhood ofCarpenters and Joiners of
America, Local 83 and Fitzgerald and Snow Ltd (13 January 1997), No 1753C (NSLRB); and United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, Local 83 and Mainland Development Limited (1997), [1998]
48 CLRBR (2d) 189 (NSLRB).
71. JKCEnterprises Ltd v Woolworth Canada Inc, 2001 ABQB 791, 96 Alta LR (3d) 129, Coutu J.
72. Carter, supra note 65; Judy Fudge, "New Wine into Old Bottles? Updating Legal Forms to
Reflect Changing Employment Norms" (1999) 33:1 UBC L Rev 129. See also Keenan v Canac
Kitchens, 2015 ONSC 1055, 2015 CLLC 210-025.
73. Supra note 26.
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how they are perceived and how they relate to the institutions of labour
regulation in Canada has changed over time and has been regulated in
different ways."4 In the halcyon days of the early post-WWII period, casual
employment, at least in the urban setting, was seen by policymakers and
labour adjudicators as outside the presumptive norms of the new welfare
state's statutorily regulated labour market. Such nominally transient
casual work was not deemed sufficiently significant to need anything
more protective than common law's contract of employment rules. Thus,
in the collective bargaining sector, casual employees were regularly
excluded by labour boards from bargaining units of full and regular part-
time employees of the sort usually organized by unions." This was done
on the theory that casuals, only rarely present in the workplace, should
not be allowed to distort bargaining in units where regular employees
could readily demonstrate a true community of interest. Similarly, in the
non-unionized sector, casual employees were disqualified from access to
certain statutory benefits available to full- or regular part-time workers in
standard employment contracts.7 6 The resulting legal construction of casual
employment as being outside the main protective regimes of labour law
created incentives for employers to engage in opportunistic and profitable
"casualization" of their workforces. However, certain casuals working
within particularly sensitive industries have traditionally benefited from,
or been subjected to, special forms of labour market regulation. Thus, at
the federal level, a special collective bargaining regime for stevedores
on Canada's coasts and inter-provincial waterways has been put in place
to enable regulated collective bargaining and thus reliable shipping in
relation to multiple "maritime employers" in various ports." This is at
odds with the "industrial plant-based bargaining" which is the norm under
the Canadian variants of the Wagner Act model. Similar multi-employer
and multi-trade or craft bargaining has been widely established by statute
in the construction industry, or at least its commercial and industrial sub-
sector." This too is at odds with the standard, industrial model of collective
74. See James W Fox, "Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship" (2003) 54:1 Case
W L Rev 1. See also Standing, supra note 26; Precarity Penalty, supra note 26; Weil, supra note 26;
Deakin and Wilkinson, supra note 36.
75. See Adams, supra note 6, ch 7 at 4-20.
76. The policy rationale for this situation is less apparent. Administrative convenience and economic
advantage for employers is a likely candidate to explain this political inertia.
77. Canada Labour Code, supra note 59, s 34.
78. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, supra note 59, Part II, which is relatively typical of
such Canadian legislation, although each jurisdiction has its peculiarities. See Joe Rose, "Interest
Arbitration and the Canadian Construction Industry" (2011) 62:4 Lab LJ 217; Alan M Minsky, "Some
Labour Relations Issues in the Construction Industry" (2001) 9 CLR (3d) 115; Richard M Brown,
"The Reform of Bargaining Structure in the Canadian Construction Industry" (1979) 3:3 Indus Rel LJ
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bargaining. Underlying these legislative initiatives were synchronous
claims from vulnerable workers in militant unions seeking protection
against exploitation and from agitated employers facing disruption of
their business activities by wildcat strikes.9 One might characterize these
special regimes for the regulation of casuals as an effective balancing of
the protective rationale from one perspective and the economic efficiency
rationale from the other. Surely both perspectives should be thought
consistent with certain notions of human capability development."o Both
have grown up within the relatively autonomous sphere of Canadian
labour market regulation.
The problem of regulating casual employees' personal work
relations arises in other work settings as well. Free-lance journalists or
broadcasters, workers in hospitality industries, entertainers, musicians,
stage hands and film industry crews can all be required to work simply
on an "as needed" basis." Sometimes these people will be hired for the
various purposes when there are no permanent or regular part-time people
working in these same classifications.8 2 In the context of unionization, this
has lately given rise to problems which are illustrated by the film industry.
Not unlike the construction industry, the film industry is characterised
by project-based, short periods of employment where workers engaged
in specialized crafts will move from one location to another and where
film-makers incorporate a new employing entity for each project. The
industrial model of plant-based certification does not function well in this
context. Actors, camera operators and technicians have different unions
which are often sufficiently well organized to assert enough pressure on
film industry employers to require the latter to sign voluntary recognition
agreements and negotiate collective agreements without the necessity for
certification by labour boards. However, tension and confusion can arise in
film industry labour relations. For example, British Columbia, in an effort
539.
79. H D Woods, Report of the Commission ofEnquiry into Industrial Relations in the Nova Scotia
Construction Industry (Halifax: Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Relations in the Nova Scotia
Construction Industry, 1970).
80. For example, unions in such industries usually provide benefits plans, and also provide craft or
trade training.
81. Historically, that is, before the emergence of the Wagner Act model in North America in 1935,
many employees in such industries were organized successfully in occupational unions: see Katherine
VW Stone, "The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and
Employment Law" (2001) 48:3 UCLAL Rev 519; Langille & Davidov, "Beyond Employees," supra
note 42.
82. For contrasting common law decisions in this area, see Ceccol v Ontario Gymnastic Federation
(2001), 55 OR (3d) 614, 204 DLR (4th) 688 (Ont CA) and compare Van Menselv Walpole IslandFirst
Nation, 2010 ONSC 6463, [2010] OJ No 5094.
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to establish a balance between film employers and film unions, has used its
trade union council bargaining provisions to regulate film industry labour
relations.8 3 There is no such specialized regulatory scheme for the film
industry in Nova Scotia; however, in a case known as Egg Films the Labour
Board in that province was persuaded to certify a bargaining unit of film
technicians, all of whom were employed on a casual basis." Moreover, the
certification in that case covered workers who were found to be non-self-
dependent contractors, and thus employees for the purposes of the Trade
Union Act," even though some operated through personal corporations
and charged sales tax on the invoices for their services. While the film
technicians were not completely dependent for their livelihood on the
certified employer, they were found to be dependent on the film industry
of which the employer and they themselves were all a part. The Labour
Board relied upon the notion of personal work relations in construing the
provisions of the statute8 6 to conclude that the heterogeneous group of
unionized film technicians were not only employees under the statute,
but that they all also shared a community of interest as workers in the
film industry, which justified their having a separate bargaining unit in
contrast to the employer's regular part-time and full-time employees.
The Board relied on the preamble to the statute" and Supreme Court
of Canada jurisprudence on freedom of association, in an explicit form
of purposive statutory interpretation to achieve this result.8 The Board
balanced the protection of workers' freedom of association against the
83. British Columbia Labour Relations Code, supra note 69, s 41. This has not been without its
difficulties and has led to various inquiries and reports, which have had varying degrees of success:
see Michael Fleming, A Report Regarding a Section 41 Inquiry into Labour Relations in the British
Columbia Film Industry (5 March 2012), online: <www.acfcwest.com/pdf/Section%/`2041%/`20
Inquiryp2020 120320.pdf>.
84. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and
Allied Crafts, Local 849 v Egg Films Inc, 2012 NSLB 120 [Egg Films], aff'd 2014 NSCA 33, [2014]
NSJ No 150, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2014] SCCANo 242. The author must disclose that he
was the Vice-Chair of the Labour Board panel which made this decision
85. Supra note 59.
86. Ibid at paras 52-54.
87. Ibid at paras 55-59, 43-48. The Preamble asserts, among other things, that "the Government of
Nova Scotia is committed to the development and maintenance of labour legislation and policy designed
for the promotion of common well-being through the encouragement of free collective bargaining
and the constructive settlement of disputes," and that "Nova Scotia employees, labour organizations
and employers recognize and support freedom of association and free collective bargaining as the
bases of effective labour relations for the determination of good working conditions and sound labour-
management relations in the public and private sector of Nova Scotia": Trade Union Act, supra note
59. These aspirational phrases could be interpreted as a commitment akin to recognizing, or at least
being consistent with, the human capability development principles outlined above.
88. See the discussion of constitutional principles from this new Supreme Court jurisprudence in
Part III, infra.
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employer's interest in economic sustainability, in ways that are arguably
consistent with human capability development. However, the Board was
careful to point out that it was adopting a historically recognized "craft
unit model" which had not been ousted by adoption of the Nova Scotia
version of the Wagner Act.89 It might be thought that this approach could
be advocated for use in other industries as an aspect of integrated labour
market regulation.9 0 At any rate, the Supreme Court of Canada' refusal
to grant leave to appeal in the Egg Films decision may be viewed as an
interesting example of the application of administrative law principles to
protect the relative autonomy of Canadian labour law and its decision-
making institutions.
There is one final and controversial example, from a "liberal
professional context," of work-related problems in drawing the boundary
lines between even relatively autonomous labour law principles and
general, commercial and economic law. InMcCormickv. FaskenMartineau
Dumoulin LLP 91 McCormick, an equity partner with an ownership interest
in his law firm, sought to challenge the rule in the partnership agreement
that he was obliged to retire at the age of 65. The British Columbia Human
Rights Tribunal found that McCormick was an employee for the purposes
of the B.C. Human Rights Code, and that he was thereby protected
against such age discrimination. In the Supreme Court of Canada, Abella
J. used the protective rationale of labour law to deprive McCormick of
protection against age discrimination in the circumstances.9 2 She stated for
a unanimous court (at para 39):
applying the control/dependency test, based on his ownership, sharing of
profits and losses, and the right to participate in management, I see him
more as someone in control of, rather than subject to, decisions about
workplace conditions. As an equity partner, he was part of the group that
controlled the partnership, not a person vulnerable to its control.93
89. Egg Films, supra note 84 at paras 64-66.
90. The work of Katherine Stone is relevant here: see Katherine Stone, Widgets to Digits:
Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)
[Stone, Widgets]. For a parallel development to that inEgg Films, supra note 84, see Browning-Ferris
Industries of California, Inc, d/b/a BFI Newby Island Recyclery, and FPR-IL LLC, d/b/a Leadpoint
Business Services, and Sanitary Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 350, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Petitioner (2015), 362 NLRB No 186, 204 LRRM 1154 [BFl]. In the latter decision, the US
National Labor Relations Board conceptualised the joint-employer in ways similar to those advocated
by Weil, supra note 26.
91. McCormick v Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39, [2014] 2 SCR 108.
92. It may be of more than passing interest to note that Abella J is a former Chair of the Ontario
Labour Relations Board and member of the Ontario Human Rights Commission.
93. Ibidatpara39.
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The court cites American and British common law authorities for its
decision, and distinguishes present U.K., Australian and New Zealand
law as containing statutory reversals of this common position. One might
suspect that some vestige of the identity theory of corporate criminal
liability, which views managers as the controlling mind of the company,9 4
rather than current analysis that sees managers as its employees (and thus
potentially vulnerable personal workers),9 5 may be driving this thinking.
The irony of using the protective rationale from labour law to trump
human rights protections against discrimination is striking, and a skeptic
might be forgiven the thought that he result would have been different had
racial or gender discrimination been at issue.9 6 The Court even noted that
human rights commissions have had their decisions upheld where they
have, in reliance on labour law decisions, interpreted the provisions of
human rights legislation to give protection to "independent contractors."
Be that as it may, the Supreme Court was not willing in this particular
instance to apply a "personal work relations" analysis rooted in any sort of
human capability development theory to uphold the application of labour
law principles to a "partner" who had been assimilated to the category of
manager.9 7 The autonomy of Canadian human rights law, as applied in a
workplace context, is thus seen to be relative and subject to corrective
review by general courts. So too is the autonomy of broader labour market
regulation, as illustrated by some of the decisions to be canvassed below.
II. Relational rights, relational contract heory and restorative labour
market regulation
Relational rights theory, including relational contract principles, is
particularly useful in thinking about how personal work relations can
be regulated in what one may regard as integrated and restorative
labour market regulation. Personal work relations are seen in Canada as
governed by long-term contracts which have particular characteristics.
These continuing relational contracts can be understood as in need of a
major overhaul to improve restorative labour market regulation in both
substantive and procedural dimensions, though piecemeal progress is
occurring in some quarters. The relative autonomy of Canadian labour law
94. Canadian Dredge and Dock Co Ltd vR, [1985] 1 SCR 662, 19DLR (4th) 314. That decision is
now superseded by amendments to the Canadian Criminal Code: RSC 1985, c C-46 as amended by
An Act to amend the Criminal Code, SC 2003, c 21.
95. Robert Flannigan, "The Employee Status of Directors" (2014) 25:3 King's LJ 370.
96. Douglas Branson, No Seat at the Table: How Corporate Governances and Law Keep Women Out
ofthe Boardroom (New York: New York University Press, 2007).
97. This is despite the fact that certain levels of supervisors or managers have frequently been found
to be unionizable employees by many Canadian labour relations boards.
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seems to have sheltered and enhanced these useful developments, which
are best understood as an embodiment of human capability development
theory. Such are the concerns of this portion of the paper.
1. Relational rights or values and relational contract heory
The confluence of two streams of relational theory can assist in thinking
about why and how personal work relations can be regulated and integrated
in restorative ways. The first body of relational theory emerges from public
law analysis, and the second from the private law of contract. Each merits
brief explication. Relational rights theories in the public law context have
emerged in some measure from the common sense empirical proposition
that all of us are literally the product of relationships, and live in and
through the totality of our relations with others.98 This important insight is
often lost in the rhetoric of neo/liberal political theory which would have
us believe that we are all simply individual rights-bearers exercising ir/
rational choices in the various arenas to which our daily life takes us. But
we exercise our personal autonomy in the context of relationships which
enhance, limit, condition and structure the choices we have available to
us.99 Our autonomy is relational in a fundamental sense, although it may
be exercised in concert or in conflict with those to whom we are "related."
Most importantly, relational rights theorists like Nedelsky see rights not
as trumps to be played against those whom we encounter, but rather as
values which structure our relationships.100 Relational theorists argue that
social relationships are best founded on the values of equality, dignity,
mutual respect and mutual concern.101 Compare this with Freedland and
Kountouris who suggest hat personal work relations rest on the key values
of dignity, capability and stability.10 2
Elsewhere I have suggested that these sets of values can be integrated
and adjusted so as to see appropriate personal work relations as rooted
in values of equality, dignity, mutual concern and respect, capability and
flex/stability.103 It is also important to note that this relational view of
rights and work is entirely consistent with human capability development
98. Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer Llewellyn, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory
and Health Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012). In particular, see their Introduction
99. Jennifer Nedelsky, "The Reciprocal Relation of Judgement and Autonomy: Walking in another's
shoes and which shoes to walk in" in Downie & Llewellyn, ibid at 35.
100. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law sRelations: A Relational Theory ofSelf Autonomy, and Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011) [Nedelsky, Law 'sRelations].
101. Ibid at 241; see also Downie & Llewellyn, supra note 98.
102. Freedland & Kountouris, supra note 50 at 369-382.
103. Bruce P Archibald, "Rights at Work: Fairness in Personal Work Relations and Restorative
Labour Market Regulation" (2016), SSRN online: <http://ssrncom/abstract= 2762976> [Archibald,
"Rights at Work"].
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theory. Sen's five "functionings," that is, political freedoms, economic
facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective
security,10 4 are ways to analyse, in the abstract, certain categories of key
relationships which can enhance development and freedom in general, or
productive and appropriate personal work relations in particular. They are
the relational context in which many important decisions are, or ought to
be, made. Sen describes sensible labour market regulation as harnessing
individual human agency through supportive "functionings,"1' which
relational theorists would surely recognize as the exercise of relational
autonomy in the context of healthy and productive institutions operating
on the basis of the relational values outlined above. We move thus toward
a theoretical basis for relational labour market regulation.
If linking relational theory as described above to personal work
relations could be thought a "top down" theoretical exercise, then the
use of relational contract theory in this context might be thought of as a
pragmatic "working from the bottom up" with theoretical consequences.
Classical contract theory tends to see the contracting process as a moment
in time surrounding offer, acceptance and consideration-a conception
that works well for the simple purchase and sale of a chattel. Relational
contract theorists, on the other hand, assert hat many contracts are intended
to create long-standing relationships.1 0 6 These relational contracts, such
as insurance, long-term supply arrangements, corporate law, contracts in
family law, and the like, are said to give rise to forms of interpretation
and institutional development which differ from standard commercial
contracts.' Common law courts have sometimes seen the world of
employment as similarly constituted by individual, generic contracts
created at a point in time, but renewing themselves constantly as the
relationship between hirer and worker continues.10 s However, relational
contract theorists have viewed the contract of employment as an archetype
104. Sen, supra note 29 at 38-40.
105. Ibid at 18.
106. See lan R Macneil, "Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries" (2000) 94:3 Nw UL
Rev 877. For a magisterial treatment of the subject, see lan R Macneil & Paul J Gudel, Contracts:
Exchange Transactions and Relations-Cases and Materials, 3rd ed (New York: Foundation Press,
2001).
107. Paul J Gudel, "Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange" (1998) 46:3 Buff L
Rev 763.
108. Even, or perhaps especially, unions were regarded as a web of individual contracts: see Orchard
v Tunney, [1957] SCR 436, 8 DLR (2d) 273. The Supreme Court of Canada put a stop to this by
holding that, as a matter of policy related to their statutory role under collective bargaining legislation,
unions were to be found legal entities which could sue and be sued in their own name: Berry v Pulley,
2002 SCC 40, [2002] 2 SCR 493 [Berry]. A statutory exception to this still holds sway in Ontario: see
the Rights ofLabourAct, RSO 1990, c R-33, ss 3(2), 3(3).
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of the relational contract, since the standard employment contract brings
about a relationship of indefinite duration which often changes and evolves
throughout its course.109 Moreover, the employment contract has been
argued to be not only relational, but intimately connected to public law
because of its significance as a potential instrument for democratization
of the workplace.110 These propositions will be examined in the light of
Canadian labour law below. Relational contract theory nonetheless fits
nicely in with the concept of the personal work relation and its various
possible applications to hiring arrangements other than the standard
contract of employment. One might regard personal work relations as
comprising a broad range of relational contracts which ought as a matter
of law to embrace values of equality, dignity, mutual concern and respect,
capability and flex/stability, and which have the potential to constitute the
foundational concept underpinning a unified field for restorative labour
market regulation in the interests of human capability development.
2. Personal work relations and restorative labour market regulation
Restorative labour market regulation refers to an integrated concept of
labour market regulation based on relational values described above,
as well substantive and procedural principles drawn from restorative
approaches to justice. The latter, as applied to personal work relations,
are consistent with human capability development heory. Explanation
is in order. Regulatory approaches to law have gained currency over the
last two decades.' Top-down, command-and-control regulatory models
have been shown to be largely ineffective, whether in the context of
totalitarian communism or in the welfare state. However, the unbridled
de-regulation in western economies in the 1980s and 1990s has revealed
itself to be inadequate in environmental, financial, and other domains,
to say nothing of labour and employment law.112 Rather than return to
alienating bureaucratic formalism, alternatives variously labelled smart
regulation, reflexive regulation, responsive regulation, or meta-regulation
have emerged in a vast literature.
109. See Robert C Bird, "Employment as a Relational Contract" (2005) 8:1 U Pa J Lab & Employment
L 149; and Tamara Cohen, "The Relational Contract of Employment" in Rochelle le Roux & Alan
Rycroft, eds, Acta Juridica 2012: Reinventing Labour Law: Reflecting on the First 15 Years of the
Labour Relations Act and Future Challenges (Claremont: Juta, 2012) 84.
110. To say nothing about its having been associated with the end of slavery in the United States. See
Fox, supra note 74.
111. See the work of Hugh Collins, Robert Baldwin, Julia Black, John Braithwaite, Christine Parker,
Malcolm Sparrow cited below, as well as a host of others.
112. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1992); Weil, supra note 26.
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Central to almost all these proposals is the involvement of regulated
stakeholders in the elaboration and enforcement of regulatory regimes,
while avoiding subversive capture of the system by those intended to be
regulated in the public interest.1 1 3 Braithwaite's restorative regulatory
pyramid envisages a graduated response to regulatory failure with
restorative methods of warnings, training or other soft sanctions in relation
to well-intentioned and cooperative regulatory targets, ascending through
deterrent fines and sanctions of rational, calculating defaulters, and license
withdrawals, closures or other definitive sanctions for flagrant or abusive
recidivists.114 Meta-regulation is about arms-length state supervision of
private industry or professional regulatory bodies, with use of inspectorates
and prosecutions as a last resort. Responsive regulation based on this sort
of approach has been skilfully advocated by Cindy Estlund in the labour
and employment law context as will be discussed below."' However,
the label restorative labour market regulation has been adopted here to
emphasize the notion that the process ought to be characterized by the
values of equality, dignity, mutual concern and respect, capability and flex/
stability set out above which are broadly associated with the notion of
restorative justice.11 6 The question is whether the institutional framework
for implementing these values for the purposes of human capability
development can be worked out on the ground through integrated and
restorative means.
While Canada is certainly not a coordinated market economy in
the European sense, it might be thought to sit somewhere between the
United States as the most free-wheeling liberal market economy and
some of the more welfare-oriented liberal market economies of the
Commonwealth.1 1 7 However, in recent decades, effective labour market
regulation has declined in Canada-not, for the most part, because of
113. Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, "Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation" (2010) 32:2 Law &
Pol'y 181
114. Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, The Governance ofHealth Safety and
Quality, by John Braithwaite, Judith Healy & Kathryn Dwan (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005).
115. Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) [Estlund, Regoverning].
116. Bruce P Archibald, "Let my People Go: Human Capital Investment and Community Capacity
Building via Meta-Regulation in a Deliberative Democracy-A Modest Contribution for Criminal
Law and Restorative Justice" (2008) 16:1 Cardozo J Int'l Comp L 85.
117. P Hall & D Soskice, eds, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative
Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Shelley Marshall, Richard Mitchell & Ian
Ramsey, eds, Varieties of Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Employees (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 2008). The latter describes aspects of labour market regulation i  Australia which is
more comprehensive than that of Canada, despite the attempts by the Howard government to introduce
American-style employment at will, which was ultimately rejected by Australian voters: see Andrew
Stewart, Stewart's Guide to Employment Law, 5th ed (Sydney: Federation Press, 2015).
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the formal repeal of legislative protections from the era of the welfare
state, but rather because of the shifting nature of the private and public
economic, social, ideological and political environments in which
labour law is applied."' In some cases, the fragmented nature of the
partial and jurisdictionally divided Canadian labour markets has always
been problematic and in need of integrated labour market responses. In
other areas, the phenomenon of de-industrialization in the face of global
competition, the rise to predominance of the hard-to-organize service
and the western Canadian resource sectors, and the retrenchment of the
broadly organized public sector through privatization of services, have all
led to greater precarious employment of the type described above, and
this calls for integrated solutions. But there have been mixed Canadian
experiences with respect to how policy-makers, courts, legislatures and
labour boards have responded to the restorative labour market possibilities
in both substantive and procedural regulatory dimensions. Substantive
areas include varied responses to outmoded common law thinking,
vertical and horizontal disintegration or fissuring of the management of
private production, and regulatory fragmentation at the administrative and
governmental levels. Some of the latter can be characterized in relation
to three of Sen's "functionings": economic facilities, social opportunities
and protective security. Procedural areas include the consolidation of
administrative jurisdiction among bodies responsible for labour market
regulation, the move to restorative adjudicative processes in relation to
individual employment disputes, and possibilities for the extension of the
participatory occupational health and safety model to other workplace
issues. Positive and negative examples from recent Canadian experience
in relation to some of these areas will be presented in the next section.
There are potentially different assessments about whether the relative
autonomy of Canadian labour and employment law is a good thing or a
bad thing in these contexts.
118. Harry Arthurs, "What Immortal Hand or Eye?-Who Will Redraw the Boundaries of Labour
Law?" in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds, Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2006) 373; see also Katherine Stone & Harry Athurs, eds, Rethinking Workplace
Regulation: Beyond the Standard Contract of Employment (New York: Russel Sage Foundation,
2013). The only stark legislative repeal of labour rights mightbe thought to be the gutting of the decree
system in the Province of Quebec: see Macduy Ngo, "Revisiting Quebec's Decrees: Can Juridical
Extension Address the Issue of Precarious Work in Canada?" (2015) 19:1 CLELJ 287. In addition, one
might view the underfunding ofinspectorates in the labour standards area s a functional equivalent at
the hands of governments: LCO Report, supra note 47; Precarity Penalty, supra note 26. With regard
to the rise of the "new economy" see the Arthurs Report, supra note 44 at 16-39, 229-250, and Weil,
The Fissured Workplace, supra, note 26.
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3. Relative autonomy for labour law and Canadian issues in restorative
labour market regulation
a. Substantive autonomy for labour market regulation: Common law and
statutory regimes
Canadian common law now embodies the critical principle that the contract
of employment represents more than a simple agreement to provide services
for remuneration, and ought not simply to be interpreted in accordance
with the principles of commercial contract.119 It is clearly accepted that,
at common law, the contract of employment differs from commercial
contracts because the assumption of equality of bargaining power between
the parties is not likely to be valid.12 0 It is now recognized that "[w]ork is one
of the most fundamental aspects in a person's life, providing the individual
with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a contributory role
in society" and that "[a] person's employment is an essential component
of his or her sense of identity, self-worth and emotional wellbeing. "121
This latter proposition goes some way to accepting that personal work
relations involve relational contracts. While employees have long been
subject to duties of good faith and loyalty,12 2 it appears that the Supreme
Court of Canada is now giving its imprimatur to the proposition that the
common law of employment imposes on employers a "duty of good faith
and fair dealing." 1 23 It is not clear the extent to which this might be seen as
a matter of autonomous labour law, since the Court has also recently held
in a commercial agency context that it was necessary "to acknowledge that
good faith contractual performance is a general organizing principle of the
common law of contract which underpins and informs the various rules in
which the common law, in various situations and types of relationships,
recognizes obligations of good faith contractual performance."1 24 But in
119. See MachtingervHOJIndustries Ltd, [1992] 1 SCR 986, 91 DLR (4th) 491.
120. Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 SCR 701 at para 92, 152 DLR (4th) 1, citing P
Davies & M Freedland, Kahn-Freunds Labour and the Law, 3rd ed (London: Stevens, 1983) at 18.
121. Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at para 95, 38
DLR (4th) 161.
122. RBC Dominion Securities Inc v Merrill Lynch Canada Inc, 2008 SCC 54, [2008] 3 SCR 79.
123. Potter, supra note 18 at para 84. The case involved a finding of constructive dismissal in
relation to a public office holder. The endorsement of the duty of good faith and fair dealing was made
with reference to D J Doorey, "Employer 'Bullying': Implied Duties of Fair Dealing in Canadian
Employment Contracts" (2005) 30:2 Queen's LJ 500, which relies heavily on English decisions
concerning the implied "duty of mutual trust and confidence." For a recent review of the concept and
cases discussed in this section, see Claire Mumme, "A Comparative Reflection from Canada-A Good
Faith Perspective" in M Freedland et al, The Contract ofEmployment (Oxford: OUP, 2016) 295.
124. Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 at para 33, [2014] 3 SCR 494. This case was about financial
services agencies, and might be viewed as an "intermediate category case" as per Carter supra note
65, although it was not characterized as such by the Court.
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the employment context, this has been held to mean that "[a]t a minimum,
acting in good faith in relation to contractual dealings means being honest,
reasonable, candid, and forthright."1 2 5 These principles may prove to be
important when dealing with disguised employment and other mechanisms
for avoiding responsibilities under the common law of employment which
distort labour market regulation otherwise based on sound principles.
In terms of integrative or even restorative labour market regulation,
another Canadian common law development of some note is the willingness
of courts to accept a common employer doctrine.12 6 Common employer
holdings have been available in employment standards legislation and
collective bargaining legislation for some time.1 2 7 However, the recent
common law articulation of the rule would appear to be very broad:
As long as there exists a sufficient degree of relationship between the
different legal entities who apparently compete for the role of employer,
there is no reason in law or in equity why they ought not all to be regarded
as one for the purpose of detennining liability for obligations owed to
those employees who, in effect, have served all without regard for any
precise notion of to whom they were bound by contract. What will
constitute a sufficient degree of relationship will depend, in each case,
on the details of such relationship, including such factors as individual
shareholdings, corporate shareholdings and inter-locking directorships.
The essence of that relationship will be the element of common control.128
While these common law developments might be thought to bode well for
the emergence of a more integrated form of labour market regulation based
on restorative values, parallel developments aremixed in the interpretation
of statutory labour and employment law legislation.1 2 9
Canadian observers with high hopes for the application of a common
employer doctrine in circumstances of global outsourcing had them dashed
in the heavily criticized case of Lian v. i Crew,13 0 which might charitably
be described as a failure to adopt purposive statutory interpretation. Lian,
125. Potter, supra note 18 at para 99.
126. In Potter, ibid at para 51, in a terse and oblique holding, the majority applied the common
employer doctrine as enunciated by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Downtown Eatery (1993) Ltd v
Ontario (2001), 54 OR (3d) 161, [2001] OJ No 1879 [Downtown].
127. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, supra note 59, s 21; Canada Labour Code, supra note
59, s 35.
128. Sinclair v Dover Engineering Services Ltd (1988), 11 BCLR (2d) 176 at para 18, [1987] BCJ No
60 (BCSC), aff'd [1988] BCJ No 265, 49 DLR (4th) 297, as cited in Downtown, supra note 126 at para
30.
129. The real problem faced by those who wish to vindicate their labour rights at common law is the
prohibitive cost of civil litigation
130. Lian v J Crew Group Inc (2001), 54 OR (3d) 239, [2001] OJ No 1708. For a discussion and
analysis of this decision, see Langille, "Chains," supra note 48.
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an immigrant to Toronto, sewed garments at the bottom of a subcontracting
chain, where the products were sold at the top ofthe chain in the defendants'
retail establishments. Links in this value chain went through Hong Kong,
among other jurisdictions. Lian sought minimum wage and vacation
entitlements, as well as class action certification for a group of similarly
situated homeworkers. Her request was given short shrift on the grounds
that while she worked in an integrated garment industry she did not work
for an integrated business which could be brought within the applicable
statutory common employer rule. Privity of contract was held to trump
the common employer provision of the Ontario Employment Standards
Act.13 1 Whether a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, i  the
light of restorative labour market values underpinning a human capability
development orientation, might hold sway in a different Canadian court
is a matter of some speculation. However, insofar as agency employment
is concerned, a more restorative note was struck by the Supreme Court
of Canada in the case of Pointe-Claire (City) v S.E.P B., Local 57.132
An employment agency supplied an office worker to the City of Pointe-
Claire. She was there for some time, and sought to be included in the city's
clerical bargaining unit by its union. Her salary and benefits were paid by
the employment agency in accordance with labour standards legislation,
but the direction and control of her actual work was in the hands of the
City's managers. The City paid a sum to the agency for its services in
finding, providing and paying the employee. The Quebec Labour Court
131. RSO 1990, c E. 14.
132. Pointe-Claire (City) v SEPB, Local 57, [1997] SCR 1015, 146 DLR (4th) 1 [Pointe-Claire].
The US case of BFL supra note 90, is of interest here. It is summarized on the US Labor Relations
Board website as follows: "In a 3-2 decision involving Browning-Ferris Industries of California, the
National Labor Relations Board refined its standard for determiningjoint-employer status. The revised
standard is designed "to better effectuate the purposes of the Act in the current economic landscape."
With more than 2.87 million of the nation's workers employed through temporary agencies in August
2014, the Board held that its previous joint employer standard has failed to keep pace with changes
in the workplace and economic circumstances. In the decision, the Board applies long-established
principles to find that two or more entities arejoint employers of a single workforce if (1) they are both
employers within the meaning of the common law, and (2) they share or codetermine those matters
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment. In evaluating whether an employer
possesses ufficient control over employees to qualify as a joint employer, the Board will-among
other factors-consider whether an employer has exercised control over terms and conditions of
employment indirectly through an intermediary, or whether it has reserved the authority to do so"
(National Labour Relations Board, "Board issues Decision in Browning-Ferris Industries," (27 August
2015), online: <https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-issues-decision-browning-
ferris-industries>). This decision is viewedby many American labour elations observers as a potential
"game changer," although it is assumed that the subsequent certification and collective bargaining
processes as regulated by the NLRB will be subject to appeal. Sometimes American developments
have an influence in Canada. Whether Canadian labour relations boards might follow the NLRB lead
and reverse decades ofjurisprudence in analogous situations is far from a foregone conclusion
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concluded that the City was her employer and that she was a member of
the bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. The majority
of the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that the governing
labour relations legislation was clearly intended to be applied to bipartite
relationships between a unitary employers and employees, but that where
the traditional characteristics of the employer are shared by two separate
entities, administrative tribunals are within their jurisdiction to use their
expertise to "fill the gap" in the legislation and provide an enforceable
protective right against the employer entity within reach.133 This decision,
in contrast to Lian v. i Crew, vindicates the employee's rights to collective
bargaining in circumstances where the employer's efforts to segment he
personal work relation in fragmented employer structures can defeat that
outcome. It thus represents an example of integrated and restorative labour
market regulation, knitting together elements of regulation from both the
labour standards provisions governing non-unionized employment (with
the agency) and unionized employment (with the host employer). It also
constitutes a remarkable example of the relative autonomy of Canadian
labour law through the Supreme Court of Canada's willingness to give
deference to the expertise of labour boards in creative approaches to labour
market regulation.134
There are other examples of substantive developments which have
emerged from the relatively autonomous sphere of Canadian labour law
and market regulation which reflect its relative and restorative dimensions,
but which are rooted in general human rights provisions. There have been
ferocious political battles on the gender front concerning equal pay for
work of equal value which has led to legislated pay equity norms in many
Canadian jurisdictions.135 This development has been enhanced in the
133. Pointe-Claire, supra note 132 at para 63. The Court noted that this "gap filling" exercise has
limits since "[i]n the final analysis ... it is up to the legislature to remedy those gaps" (ibid). Moreover,
there are practical issues to be worked out. The Court suggested that the "agency would [have to]
adjust her wages to take account of the wage rate determined by the collective agreement...," but
while the Court also suggested that "a grievance could [be] filed" to deal with disagreements over the
meaning of the collective agreement (ibid at para 60), it said nothing about how any disagreement
between the City and the agency should be resolved. For a sophisticated scholarly analysis of how
such issues might be resolved, see Jeremias Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015).
134. The value of this case as a precedent has not gone unnoticed by labour boards: see, e.g., Egg
Films, supra note 84, and another Nova Scotia Labour Board decision, Re RU Safe Inc and UBJCA,
Local 83 (2015), LB-0667 (NSLB). Once again, the parallel with the US decision in BFI, supra note
90, is instructive.
135. Peter Barnacle et al, Employment Law in Canada, 4th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2005) (loose-
leaf release 62, 2016), ch 8 at 334.2. Three "levels" of equal pay legislation interact: employment
standards, human rights, and in some jurisdictions "pay equity" legislation. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Pay
EquityAct, RSNS 1989, c 337; Ontario Pay EquityAct, RSO 1990, c P-7; New Brunswick Pay Equity
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public sector due to the applicability of section 15 ofthe Charter on equality
rights.13 6 Litigation on the issue has had variable success,1 3 7 but its threats
have sometimes led to significant settlements.1 3 8 The other significant
human rights prodded development of Canadian labour law in the last
two decades has been the recognition of the obligation on employers,
and indeed unions, to accommodate the special workplace needs and
potential of workers with disabilities.13 9 Human rights commissions and
labour arbitrators have spear-headed this development,140 with the courts,
particularly the Supreme Court of Canada, providing encouragement
through deference to these administrative tribunal decisions, though
with substantial enhancement of principles involved, such as the notion
of bona fide occupational requirements as limits on accommodation.141
This development has dramatically changed human relations practices
among virtually all large employers, and is being felt in medium and
small business circles as well. Both the pay equity and disability
accommodation situations are clearly consistent with notions of human
capability development theory and are another important example of the
relative autonomy of Canadian labour law.
The final area of substantive labour market regulation struggling
toward integration in Canada is the area of Sen's fifth category of supportive
functionings: "protective security, including unemployment benefits,
social and old age security." By a post-WW II amendment o the Canadian
constitution, unemployment benefits (now called employment insurance,
Act, SNB 2009, c P-5.05; Manitoba Pay Equity Act, SM 1985-86, c 21; and the Canadian Human
RightsAct, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 11, and Equal Wages Guidelines, 1986, SOR/86-1082.
136. Charter, supra note 18, s 15. See Dianne Pothier, "The Significance of Entrenchment of Equality
Rights" in Joseph Eliot Magnet et al, eds, The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms: Reflections
on the Charter After Twenty Years (Markham: LexisNexis, 2003) 65.
137. See, e.g., NAPE v Newfoundland (Treasury Board), 2004 SCC 66, [2004] 3 SCR 38 1; Dartmouth
(City) v Nova Scotia (Pay Equity Commission) (1994), 134 NSR (2d) 308, 119 DLR (4th) 182 (NSCA),
where the pay equity issue led to what was found to be inappropriate contracting out of a public service
to avoid the financial implications of a decision of the Pay Equity Commission
138. See, e.g., PSAC v Canada (Treasury Board), [2000] 1 FCR 146, 180 DLR (4th) 95 (FC),
in which the PSAC successfully applied to the Canadian Human Rights Commission to have the
Canadian Treasury Board retroactively compensate its female employees with wage adjustments from
June 1998 to March 1985. After failing on review, the government reached an agreement on how to
implement the ruling.
139. Michael Lynk, "Disability and Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with
Disabilities in Canada" in The Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures 2007: Employment
Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 189.
140. Michael Lynk, "A Hardy Transplant: The Duty to Accommodate and Disability Rights in
Canadian Labour Law" (1998) 49:4 Lab LJ 962.
141. Ibid at 964. See, e.g., British Columbia (Public Service Relations Commission) v British
Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union (BCGESU) (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] 3
SCR 3, 176 DLR (4th) 1 [Meiorin]; McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v
Syndicat des employes de 1H6pital general de Montreal, 2007 SCC 4, [2007] 1 SCR 161.
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or "EI") are a matter of federal jurisdiction.142 El benefits have long been
extended to include parental leave (a good thing),143 but have been the focus
of recent ideologically driven changes on the part ofthe federal government
to reduce availability of benefits, particularly to seasonal workers (a
problematic thing)."' However, the larger problem under the Canadian
constitution is that the provinces have jurisdiction over social security
benefits in general,"' and that it is difficult to coordinate protective social
security policies across these constitutional divides.146 This constitutional
problem extends to the complex regulatory situation of retirement and
old age pensions. Most Canadian workers employed in the private sector
have no, or inadequate, retirement pensions to cover their needs when
they are unable to work, or no longer wish to do so.' In the unionized
sector, where pension coverage is high, collective bargaining lately has
led to frequent impasses where employers are increasingly pressing for
the abandonment of post-war "defined benefits" pension plans which
provide employees with predictable levels of benefits, in favour of less
costly and less burdensome, self-directed "defined contributions" pension
plans, which provide employees with less certain retirement benefits.'
142. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(2A) [Constitution Act, 1867] reprinted in
RSC 1985, App II, No 5 as amended by the Constitution Act, 1940 (UK), 3 & 4 Geo VI, c 36.
143. See, e.g., Employment Insurance Act, SC 1996, c 23, s 23.
144. Judy Fudge, "Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The Paradox of
International Rights for Migrant Workers" (2012) 34:1 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 95; Kerry Preibisch,
"Development as Remittances or Development as Freedom? Exploring Canada's Temporary
Migration Programs from a Rights-based Approach" in Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, eds,
Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2012) 81; see also Fraser, supra note 60.
145. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 142 ss 92(13), 92(16); see also ReAdoption Act, [1938] SCR
398 at para 3, [1938] 3 DLR 497.
146. An example of this difficulty is the creation of what would become the Canadian Pension Plan.
Initially, in the late 1920s, pensions were administered by the provinces with cost contributions by the
federal government. When the federal government decided to establish its own scheme, two issues
arose: division of powers (provinces controlled labour relations and therefore employer/employee
voluntary contribution schemes) and taxation (provinces could not finance their share through levying
indirect sales tax). The proposed solution was "inter-delegation," wherein the provincial and federal
(Dominion) governments delegate their power to the other jurisdiction In a reference case some y ars
later, this arrangement was found to be unconstitutional. The lasting solution was more extreme and
demonstrates the inter-governmental coordination issues: a series of amendments to the Constitution
Act, 1867 in order to give the federal Parliament power to make laws in relation to old age pensions
and supplementary benefits under section 94A: Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed
(Toronto: Carswell, 2007) (loose-leaf supplement 2015), ch 14 at 17-19, ch 33 at 8-11.
147. Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance: Safe Pensions, Affordable Rules, Fair Rules
(Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2008) [Expert Commission on Pensions]; Pension Review
Panel, Promises to Keep (Halifax: Nova Scotia Department of Labour and Workforce Development,
2009) [Pension Review Panel]; Elizabeth Shilton, "Employee Pension Rights and the False Promise
of Trust Law" (2011) 34:1 Dal LJ 81
148. Bob Baldwin, "The Economic Impact on Plan Members of the Shift from Defined Benefit to
Defined Contribution in Workplace Pension Plans" (2015) 19:1 CLELJ 23.
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There is a public Canada Pension Plan (CPP), to which both employees
and employers contribute, if operating within the framework of standard
contracts of employment.14 9 The CPP maxima do not provide benefits
which will keep recipients above the poverty line,150 and a supplemental
federal old age security system does not usually fill the gap."1 Provincial
and regional pension studies have recommended creation of government
sponsored multi-employer pension plans which cover the self-employed
and other categories of non-standard "personal work relations."1 5 2 Others
advocate the expansion and extension of the CPP1 5 3 However, cooperative
federalism broke down under the Harper federal government and it may
be too early to tell whether under the Trudeau federal government the
proposed coherent solutions to the pension problem are within the current
grasp of Canadian politicians at the various levels of government. " In this
pension morass, the common law courts have sometimes taken tentative
steps toward integrated and restorative steps to support worker needs."
However, it is clear that the goal of integrated and restorative labour
market regulation in the interests of human capability development is far
from being attained in the area of protective social security. Canada has
149. Canada Pension Plan, RSC 1985, c C-8.
150. The current maximum yearly pension under the CPP is less than CAD 13,000. For cultural and
political reasons, the Province of Quebec has asserted its right to establish its own pension plan.
151. OldAge SecurityAct, RSC 1985, c 0-9.
152. See, e.g., Expert Commission on Pensions, supra 147; Pension Review Panel, supra note 147.
153. The labour movement in particular: see Canadian Union of Public Employees, "Submission
to the Department of Finance Canada's Consultation Paper Entitled 'Voluntary Supplement to the
Canada Pension Plan"' (email submitted 10 September 2015), online: <cupe.ca>; Canadian Union
of Public Employees, "Top 10 Reasons it's Time to Expand the Canada Pension Plan" (3 May 2013),
online: <cupe.ca>; United Steelworkers of America, "Re: Consultations on a Voluntary Supplement o
the Canada Pension Plan" (email submitted 10 September 2015), online: <usw.ca>.
154. An exception to this dismal picture of federal-provincial antagonism in labour market regulation
are the long standing relations with respect to workers' compensation schemes where workers in
federally regulated industries obtain workers' compensation benefits from the provincial system in
the province where the worker is hired. Constitutional competency over workers' compensation is
discussed in a trilogy of cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, which dealt primarily with
occupational health and safety: Canadian National Railway Co v Courtois, [1988] 1 SCR 868, 51
DLR (4th) 271; Bell Canada v Quebec (Commission de santP et de la sdcurit du travail du Quebec),
[1988] 1 SCR 749, 51 DLR (4th) 161; Alltrans Express Ltdv British Columbia (Workers /Workmen &
Compensation Board), [1988] 1 SCR 897, 51 DLR (4th) 253. Federal employees have substantive
workers' compensation benefits administered by the provinces. This is done through incorporation
by reference and federal/provincial administrative inter-delegation. Federally regulated employees
may seek recourse under provincial workers' compensation schemes, though any provision within
a provincial compensation statute which regulates occupational health and safety will be limited to
provincial undertakings.
155. See King v 1416088 Ontario Ltd. (Danbury Industrial), 2015 ONCA 312, 2015 CLLC 210-
045, where the court found that the common law "common employer" doctrine applied to protect the
pension rights of an employee of 38 years' service whose pension entitlements had been denied after
a corporate reorganization.
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a considerable distance to go before a scheme such as a "social drawing
fund" of the European sort, arising out of an understanding of labour law
as a part of "social law," could be implemented, though it is not beyond the
realm of contemplation.15 6
b. Procedural autonomy in restorative labour market regulation
As is implicit in the above discussion of substantive labour market
regulation, its procedural aspects are shared among a plethora of institutions
drawing their jurisdiction from a variety of sources of law. The general
courts of the provinces draw their authority from the constitution and from
Judicature Acts which grant to provincial superior courts the inherent
powers of English common law courts plus those of courts of English
courts of equity.1"' The common law of employment, substantive elements
of which were described above, is the default paradigm, applicable to those
who choose not to invoke the limited remedies of the administrative system
under employment standards legislation' or who are not governed by
collective bargaining legislation, which ousts virtually all of the common
law of employment.159 In essence the common law of employment is the
preserve of affluent employers and employees, mostly managers and
professionals, who wish to litigate high-stakes employment disputes and
who have the financial wherewithal to do so.160 The only exception to this
is the recent popularity of class action litigation undertaken by groups
of non-unionized, ordinary employees who wish to tackle questionable
employment practices by major employers, such as the national banks.1 6 1
Employment standards tribunals, which deal with minimum standards of
employment, have inspectorates and administrative staff who can assist
complainants of lesser means, whose complaints may relate to failure to
pay minimum wage, vacation entitlements and the like. Recent research
indicates that understaffed inspectorates, lack of legal knowledge on
the part of many vulnerable employees, and inadequate remedial clout
156. Alain Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future ofLabour Law in Europe
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
157. Hogg, supra note 146, ch 5. Quebec is an exception given its Civil Code and civilian tradition in
private law: Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64; Henri Kelada, Code civil du Quebec: texte annote
(Montreal: Carswell, 1993).
158. Barnacle et al, supra note 135, ch 1 at 1-8; Ball, supra note 5, ch 1 at 1-7.
159. McGavin Toastmaster LtdvAinscough, [1976] 1 SCR 718, [1975] SCJ No 51.
160. Arthurs Report, supra note 44 at 171-172.
161. See, e.g., three class actions claiming overtime pay by federal employees regulated under the
Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2: McCraken v Canadian National Railway, 2012 ONSC 6838,
[2012] OJ No 5716; Fresco v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2012 ONCA 444, 111 OR (3d)
501; leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34987 (20 March 2013); Fulawka v Bank ofNova Scotia, 2012
ONCA 443, [2012] OJ No 2885, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34932 (20 March 2013). It appears
that this litigation may be handled by counsel paid, in part, through contingency fee arrangements.
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has meant that employment standards enforcement in Canada is highly
problematic.1 6 2 It is largely used by former employees trying to wrestle
entitlements from employers who may have cheated or wrongfully
dismissed them, but does not seem to be effective to protect employees
who wish to improve their ongoing employment circumstances.1 6 3 In other
words, most employees are afraid to invoke employment standards unless
their employment relationship has become moribund. This is hardly a
system characterized by effective support for values of equality, autonomy,
mutual concern and respect, and flex/stability, or even economic efficiency
and productivity. There is thus a sense in which Canadian labour standards
systems are a relatively autonomous subset of the legal system, but a
relatively ineffective one from a procedural perspective.
The situation of unionized employees who wish to vindicate their rights
under collective agreements i markedly better than those confined by the
procedural limitations of the common law or the labour standards system.
All labour relations legislation across the country has a requirement that
disputes as to the proper administration of collective agreements are to
be settled by arbitration, that is, through the adjudication of grievances
by an arbitrator chosen jointly by union and employer, or appointed by
the minster of labour in the absence of a privately agreed choice.16 4 Since
unions recognized under Canada's Wagner Act systems get exclusive
authority over the conduct of grievance procedures on behalf of their
membership, they are bound by a duty of fair representation in relation to
all members of the bargaining unit.1 65 Should a unionized employee feel
that he or she is not getting a fair deal out of the union in the handling of
his or her grievance, there is a right to make a duty of fair representation
complaint to the labour board, which normally has broad authority to
require unions to rectify their failures with remedies that may affect other
employees and the employer.16 6 This duty of fair representation is an
example of the evolving autonomy of Canadian labour law. In the early
days of the Wagner Act model in some Canadian jurisdictions, labour
162. Arthurs Report, supra note 44 at 178-185; Leah Vosko, Eric Tucker, Mark P Thomas &
Mary Gellatly, New Approaches to Enforcement and Compliance with Labour Standards: The
Case of Ontario, Canada (2011) Comparative Research L & Political Economy 31/2011, online:
<digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/69>.
163. Kyle Buott, Larry Haiven & Judy Haiven, Labour Standards Reform in Nova Scotia: Reversing
the War Against Workers (Halifax: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2012).
164. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, supra note 6, ch 12 at 13-23.
165. Ibid, ch 13. The duty of fair representation involves, among other things, the requirement of
union officials to act in good faith, in ways that are neither discriminatory, arbitrary, nor negligent: ibid
at 21-40.1. See also Judd v CEP Local 2000 (2003), 91 CLRBR (2d) 33, [2003] BCLRBD No 63.
166. Ibid, ch 13 at 72-74.
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boards had no authority to handle duty of fair representation complaints
and dissatisfied employees would have to seek a remedy in the general
courts. This was regarded as impractical and unsatisfactory to employees,
unions and employers alike, and has now generally been replaced by
the labour board process, where complainants have the investigatory
assistance of labour board staff.167 Duty of fair representation problems
have thus been brought within the relatively autonomous phere of labour
law and labour board regulation, with deference from the courts under the
general principles of administrative review.168 Given the union's ability to
stand up to the superior power of most employers on behalf of employees,
the system is more effective than the remedial deficiencies of the labour
standards system, though it is not without its critics.169
There are interesting developments concerning the jurisdiction of
Canadian labour and employment law tribunals which resonate with issues
of both integrated labour market regulation and the autonomy of labour
law. Labour market regulation in Canada, not untypically for a country in
the common law tradition, evolved through piecemeal statutory responses
to perceived problems with the common law. As the welfare state gathered
strength, workers compensation legislation, collective bargaining statutes,
labour standards legislation, occupational health and safety regulation,
social security schemes and human rights protection systems emerged.
However, each was traditionally established under a separate statute with
separate, independent administrative tribunals to implement each statutory
scheme. Under pressures for de-regulation, government down-sizing and
purported administrative efficiency in the last two decades, there have
been initiatives across Canada to amalgamate tribunals with mandates
to govern these aspects of labour market regulation. So-called "super-
boards" have been created, which have authority to regulate some or all of
the above mentioned subject areas. At first blush, one might have thought
this presaged an integrated approach to labour market regulation. Perhaps
a tribunal dealing with employment standards and collective bargaining
167. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, supra note 59, s 56A; British Columbia Labour Relations
Code, supra note 69, s 12; Ontario Labour Relations Act, ibid, Schedule A, ss 74 and 96.
168. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, supra note 6, ch 4. Many Canadian statutes establishing
labour boards contain "privative clauses" that claim to severely limit judicial review of labour board
decisions. The current approach finds its core in Dunsmuir, supra note 13, in which the Supreme
Court of Canada reduced the judicial standards of review to correctness and reasonableness. It also
held-with particular reference to labour relations-that administrative tribunals ought to be accorded
appropriate deference in relation to their expertise.
169. Bernard Adell, "Collective Agreements and Individual Rights: A Note on the Duty of Fair
Representation" (1986) 11:2 Queen's LJ 251. See also the work of Clyde Summers, e.g., "Unions
without Majority: A Black Hole?" (1990) 66:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 531.
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might be expected to adopt similar definitions of "employment," establish
parallel legislative entitlements for casual employees, or create compatible
approaches to tactical corporate fragmentation or disguised employment i
relation to each area which was formerly administered by separate tribunals.
However, this has not necessarily been the case. Board amalgamation
seems to have been almost entirely the product of the political desire to
reduce government budgets or create perceived administrative efficiencies
rather than to engage in integrated labour market regulation. Amalgamated
boards have often simply been given the mandate to administer the
previous statutes and apply previous policies, rather than been encouraged
to take an integrated approach to labour market regulation. However, as
understanding of the need to view problems of personal work relations
in context becomes more widespread, and as the personnel staffing these
super-boards gain more experience in dealing with analogous problems
across parallel statutory schemes, integrated approaches to restorative
labour market regulation may emerge from the ground up.170 Time will
tell.
One of the most significant procedural aspects of Canadian labour
law, in so far as its autonomy is concerned, is the particular role of labour
arbitrators in labour markets dominated by collective bargaining. There are
two types of labour arbitration in Canada. The first is interest arbitration
where neutral third parties are asked to resolve issues in collective
bargaining and to "settle" a collective agreement where the parties have
reached an impasse in bargaining.' This differs from conciliation or
mediation by public or privately appointed neutrals who may assist the
parties themselves to "get to yes."172 By contrast, interest arbitrators will
hear argument from the parties and then determine the substantive content
and wording of provisions of the collective agreement on issues where
the parties were unable to agree. Interest arbitrators in this sense actually
write critically contested parts of collective agreements in a process of
adversarial adjudication. There will be further discussion below on
interest arbitration in connection with the new constitutionally recognized
right to strike. The second form of labour arbitration in Canada is rights
arbitration, more commonly known as grievance arbitration, which arises
170. Elizabeth Shilton & Kevin Banks, The Changing Role ofLabour Relations Boards in Canada:
Key Research Questions for the 21st Century" (Kingston: Centre for Law in the Contemporary
Workplace, 2014).
171. Adams, supra note 6, ch 11 at 72-72.2.
172. See Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In,
revised ed (New York: Penguin, 2011).
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in relation to the administration of existing collective agreements.1 7 3
Where one of the parties, usually the union rather than the employer,
alleges that there has been a violation of a provision of the collective
agreement, a grievance will be entered, and labour arbitrators rather than
courts will have jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter."17 This second form
of arbitration will be the immediate focus of the discussion here, although
both interest and rights arbitration may correctly be considered important
aspects of Canadian labour law which contribute to its relative autonomy
from other aspects of the legal system.
Grievance arbitration, as mentioned above, is a mandatory aspect of
the administration of collective agreements in the unionized sectors of
every jurisdiction in Canada. Every collective agreement must, by law,
contain a dispute resolution clause negotiated by the parties, failing which
a statutory arbitration clause will be deemed to be a part of the collective
agreement. 17' Labour arbitration, when introduced in the post-WW II era
under Canadian Wagner Act models, was intended to be a quick, cost
effective and expert means to resolve disputes in the workplace over the
interpretation and application of collective agreements.1 7 6 The decisions
of arbitrators, while formally binding only upon the parties, began to be
seen as helpful examples for the resolution of analogous cases under the
collective agreements of other parties. Parties and their counsel began to
collect arbitration awards, as the decisions of arbitrators are known, and
use them as precedents." Legal publishing houses saw a commercial
opportunity and began to market labour arbitration reports series.17 ' Legal
academics, many of whom acted as labour arbitrators, organized and
analyzed these arbitration cases in textbooks on labour arbitration. 179 This
173. There are at least four well-respected Canadian textbooks on this topic: Donald J Brown &
David M Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 4th ed (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2006); Ronald M
Snyder, Collective Agreement Arbitration in Canada, 5th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2013); Morton
Mitchnick & Brian Etherington, Labour Arbitration in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Lancaster House,
2006); and in the French language, see Fernand Morin et al, Droit de l'arbitrage de grief 6th ed
(Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2012).
174. Union grievances tend to allege employer failure to extend collective agreement rights to
individual employees, where employer grievances tend to be about alleged wrongful collective union
activities, such as wild-cat strikes. For the latter, see, e.g., the decision of then-arbitrator Bora Laskin
inRe Polymer Corp and Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers (1959), 10 LAC 51.
175. Adams, supra note 6, ch 12 at 13. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, RSNS 1989, c 475,
s42.
176. Adams, supra note 6, ch 1 at 11-16.
177. Donald J Brown & David M Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 4th ed (Aurora: Canada Law
Book, 2006) (loose-leaf release no 49, 2016), ch 1 at 12-18; Carteret al, supra note 9 at 74.
178. See, e.g., Labour Arbitration Cases (Canada Law Book), which were first published in Toronto
in 1948 by the Industrial Relations Institute.
179. Supra note 173.
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body of jurisprudence began, in some quarters, to be called the "common
law of the workplace."so Arbitrators, in interpreting collective agreements,
would not only refer to this non-binding but increasingly persuasive
arbitral case law in their reasons for decisions, but began to assert that
the parties in collective bargaining must be taken to be aware of well-
settled principles of labour arbitration when negotiating their collective
agreements."' As mentioned above, Canadian administrative law treated
labour arbitrators as expert decisional tribunals worthy of deference by
courts. The courts defer to arbitrators on a standard of reasonableness in
their interpretations of collective agreements and labour related statutes,
though the courts assert willingness to intervene to "correct" arbitrators
who go astray on general propositions of law or non-labour statutes.1 8 2
This of course occurs in a context where labour arbitrators have been
given jurisdiction to adjudicate workplace disputes which may require the
interpretation and application of the constitution, human rights legislation,
and even the common law, in order to achieve what the arbitrator
considers to be ajust result.1 8 3 The upshot of all this has been a procedural
"legalization and professionalization" of arbitration. Labour arbitration
has become an autonomous sphere of specialized dispute resolution, but
it has also become more and more dominated by lawyers presenting the
cases for unions and employers, rather than lay union representatives or
managers and human relations consultants. It is more and more costly,
time-consuming and formalistic as a result. 184 Arbitrators are now writing
decisions with an eye as much to the possibility of judicial review as to
the practical needs of the parties-in recognition that their autonomy is
only relative and not complete. Respected observers complain that labour
arbitration is no longer fulfilling its original role of giving quick, cost-
effective justice in the unionized workplace.'
180. See generally the work of Harry Arthurs.
181. Brown & Beatty, supra note 177, ch 1 at 16. For an overview of these principles, see Snyder,
supra note 170 at 21-55.
182. See Dunsmuir, supra note 13, and see also the discussion in note 165.
183. Brown & Beatty, supra note 177, ch 1 at 18-32. See also Weber, supra note 14; Parry Sound,
supra note 14.
184. Hon WarrenK Winkler, "Labour Arbitration and Conflict Resolution: Back to our Roots" (Donald
Wood Lecture, delivered at the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 30 November 2010),
online: <irc.queensu.ca>; Bruce P Archibald, "Progress in Models of Justice: From Adjudication/
Arbitration throughMediationto Restorative Conferencing (and Back)" in Ronalda Murphy & Patrick
Molinari, eds, Doing Justice: Dispute Resolution in the Courts and Beyond (Montreal: Canadian
Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2007) 129 [Archibald, "Progress"].
185. Winkler, supra note 184; Michel Picher, "The Canadian Railway Office ofArbitration: Keeping
Grievance Hearings on the Rails" (1991) 1 Labour Arbitration Yearbook 37; Andi Balla, "Labour
arbitration gone 'off trajectory': Ontario Chief Justice." Canadian Lawyer Magazine (2 May 2011),
online: <www.canadianlawyermag.com>.
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Necessity being the mother of invention, the parties to arbitration
and their counsel, and latterly governments, have gradually fashioned
solutions to issues of the slow and expensive nature of formal arbitration.
Various types of "expedited arbitration" have been tried.1 86 These have
involved rules about hearings held promptly after the date of filing the
grievance, presentation of evidence through agreed-upon statements of
fact, requirements for arbitrators to issue awards within certain times
from the date of hearing, and agreements that such "quick fix" awards
will not be used as precedents. Such efforts at expedited arbitration appear
generally to have failed for a number of reasons, even when enshrined
in statute."' However, there seems to be agreement across Canada that
mediation-arbitration, or "med-arb" as it is known, works to reduce time
and expense in the resolution of grievances for a wide range of cases."'
The practice of med-arb can be seen as a somewhat formalized extension
of the common and traditional efforts of arbitrators to assist the parties
to achieve an informal settlement of their grievance dispute rather than
to engage in a full hearing. In med-arb, the person appointed as an
arbitrator will first make efforts to mediate a settlement through standard
approaches, such as caucusing with the parties privately, trying to identify
common interests, and doing shuttle diplomacy (and perhaps some arm-
twisting) with respect o possible solutions. However, the parties will have
agreed at the outset that, in the event they are unable to achieve a mediated
settlement, the arbitrator will resume his role as adjudicator and decide the
matter, giving reasons for his or her decision. There are risks that in the
mediation phase the arbitrator may have said or done things which give
rise to a perception of bias.1 8 9 However, skilled practitioners of the art
are usually able to maintain the confidence of the parties and avoid such
pitfalls. Legislators in many Canadian jurisdictions have been persuaded
of the value of med-arb and have given it statutory recognition.1 9 0 This
186. Shannon Rae Webb, "Expedited Arbitration: Is it Expeditious? Evidence from Canada" (PhD
Thesis, Saint Mary's University, 2015) [unpublished].
187. Results vary from province to province with the differences in their respective legislative
schemes and professional practices. Ontario seems to have been more successful than Nova Scotia:
see Webb, ibid.
188. See David C Elliott, "Med/Arb: Fraught with Danger or Ripe with Opportunity?" (1995) 34:1
Alta L Rev 163; Archibald, "Progress," supra note 184.
189. To some extent, this may be seen as a variant of what is becoming known in some administrative
law circles as "active adjudication": see Michelle Flaherty, "Self-Represented Litigants, Active
Adjudication and the Perception of Bias" (2015) 38:1 Dal LJ 119; Michelle Flaherty, "Best Practices
in Active Adjudication" (2015) 28:3 Can J Admin L & Prac 291; Lorne Sossin, "Administrative
Justice & Adjudicative Ethics in Canada" (2012) 25:2 Can J Admin L & Prac 131.
190. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, supra note 59, s 43C; British Columbia Labour Relations
Code, supra note 69, ss 74-78; Ontario Labour RelationsAct, ibid, s 50.
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protects med-arbiters against specious allegations of bias merely for
having agreed to and conducted such a proceeding, and clothes them
with the authority to truncate the evidentiary phase by using information
acquired in the process of mediation and by making orders for providing
evidence on matters which require further clarification. This innovative
practice would appear to be rooted in restorative values which reflect the
relational aspects of dispute resolution under collective agreements.1 9 1
Med-arb respects the autonomy of the parties in collective labour relations
and the cost-effectiveness, efficiency and finality of the dispute resolution
processes under collective agreements. To the extent that the system
succeeds in keeping labour dispute resolution "in-house" and away from
the courts in judicial review proceedings, med-arb enhances the autonomy
of Canadian labour law.
Another procedural labour relations innovation receiving recognition
in some Canadian jurisdictions is restorative workplace conferencing.1 9 2
This technique, rooted in restorative values and approaches to dispute
resolution, goes beyond mediation to identify relational issues which
may affect more than individual grievors or the union per se. It can be
particularly valuable in resolving matters which extend beyond individual
bargaining units and which may involve workplace cultural dysfunctions
resulting in bullying, sexual harassment, abuse by authoritarian superiors
and the like. This approach is also being promoted by certain human rights
commissions, and has had application by them in disputes arising out of
workplaces.1 93 This innovation, while in its infancy, may benefit from the
relatively autonomous spaces created by the heterogeneous procedural
patchwork which is Canadian labour law.
The final procedural issue worth considering from an integrated
and restorative labour market management perspective is the procedural
problem of enhancing the enforcement potential of labour standards
regimes in the non-unionized sectors of the economy. There are individual
solutions possible, such as presumptive tenure for employees who have
been unfairly penalized by their employer, particularly for having asserted
their rights under labour standards legislation. However, from the twin
observations that in workplaces where there are unions there are fewer
191. George Adams, Mediating Justice: Legal Dispute Negotiations (Toronto: CCH Publishing,
2003); see also John Braithwaite, "Emancipation and Hope" in Valerie Braithwaite, ed, Hope, Power
and Governance (2004) 592 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Special
Issue).
192. Archibald, "Progress," supra note 184.
193. See, e.g., the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission's dispute resolution process, "Restorative
Approaches," online: Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission < http://humanrights.novascotia.ca>.
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occupational health and safety violations, and that union density across
the labour market is in decline, one may draw some inferences concerning
enforcement policy improvements. Cindy Estlund has convincingly argued
that occupational health and safety regulation in North America, including
Canada, provides a better model for labour standards enforcement.19 4 At
the core of occupational health and safety regulation is not only a set of
health and safety standards with inspectors and quasi-criminal enforcement
legislation, but also a system of bi-partite occupational health and safety
committees. Occupational health and safety committees, composed ofequal
numbers of employee and management nominees, are now mandatory for
employing establishments of a certain size. These committees must meet
regularly and are entitled to raise health and safety related issues affecting
the workplace, the need for policies and improved practices, etc. These
mechanisms have had some success in improving workplace health and
safety practices, indicating that collective action or formal strength in
numbers and democratic practices in the workplace can improve health
and safety. Why not extend jurisdiction of workplace committees to labour
standards issues other than health and safety?1 9 5 The lessons of "total
quality management" and "quality circles" from recent human-relations
management theory and practice reinforce the value of such an approach.1 96
Restorative justice theory leads in the same direction. Such reforms would
represent integrated and restorative labour market management consistent
with human capability development theory as well. Their implementation
would have to be informed by rigorous restorative justice or relational
theory, but here are indications that such ideas may be gaining a foothold
in the corners of some management schools.1 9 7 However, such options can
emerge on an experimental basis from the spaces created in the kind of
relative autonomy which characterizes Canadian labour law.
194. Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 115.
195. See also David J Doorey "A Model of Responsive Workplace Law" (2012) 50:1 Osgoode Hall
LJ 47.
196. See Stone, Widgets, supra note 90.
197. Tyler G Okimoto & Michael Wenzel, "Bridging Diverging Perspectives and Repairing Damaged
Relationship in the Aftermath of Workplace Transgressions" (2014) 24:3 Business Ethics Q 443; Ryan
Fehr & Michele J Gelfand, "The Forgiving Organization: A Multi-Level Model of Forgiveness at
Work" (2012) 37:4 Academy Management Rev 664; Susan Hanley Duncan, "Workplace Bullying and
the Role Restorative Practices Can Play inPreventing and Addressingthe Problem" (2011) 32:10 Indus
LJ 2331; Jerry Goodstein & Karl Aquino, "And Restorative Justice For All: Redemption, Forgiveness
and Reintegration in Organizations" (2010) 31 J Orgnizational Behavior 624; Jerry Goodstein &
Kenneth Butterfield "Extending the Horizon ofBusiness Ethics: Restorative Justice and the Aftermath
of Unethical Behavior" (2010) 20:3 Business Ethics Q 453; Deborah L Kidder, "Restorative Justice:
Not 'Rights', but the Right Way to Heal Relationships at Work" (2007) 18:1 Intl J Confl Mgmt 4.
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III. The Canadian constitution, fundamental rights, legal autonomies
and labour market regulation
The notion of autonomy is fraught with ambiguity, and this is particularly
acute when looking at labour market regulation through the somewhat
distorting lens of the Canadian Constitution. By contrast, the question of
the autonomy of labour law has most recently arisen in the context of
the current European tensions caused by colliding jurisprudence from the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on economic rights versus
that from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) dealing with
social and labour rights.19 8 That stark systemic bifurcation is not possible
under Canadian constitutional arrangements. It is necessary first to
examine the federal/provincial division of legislative authority under the
Canadian constitution, which impacts both economic and social interests
and/or rights, and then to see how recent decisions from the Supreme
Court of Canada, particularly under the Charter are playing out in relation
to labour market regulation and its relatively autonomous character.
198. See Mark Freedland & Jeremias Prassl, supra note 2 at 3-6. In iking, a ferry operator wanted
to reflag its ship in Estonia so that it could essentially avoid an onerous collective agreement covering
its crew. A circular was issued in London by the Transportation Workers' Federation in support
of the Finnish Seamen's Union (the latter being affected by the reflagging), in which it asked all
affiliated unions to not enter negotiations with the operator. Once Estonia joined the European Union,
the operator brought an action in the English courts arguing that the circular violated its freedom
of movement rights under EU law. The CJEU was asked to rule on a series of questions. The court
found on the facts that, while there was a fundamental freedom of establishment under EU law, it had
been used isproportionately to limit the operator's free movement rights: ITWF and FSU v liking
Line ABP, C-438/05, [2007] ECR 1-10779, [2008] IRLR 143. In Laval, industrial actions were taken
to influence a Latvian construction company into enter collective agreements with Swedish unions
to cover its Latvian employees who were working in Sweden. Eventually, the company was forced
to stop all work in Sweden. Similar to liking (released a week earlier), the CJEU found that while
there was a fundamental right to strike, in this instance it had been employed disproportionally and
restricted the construction company's (EU) free movement rights: Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareforbundets, C-34/105, [2007] ECRI-11767, [2008] IRLR 160. Meanwhile the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been interpreting the nature of the right to strike under
Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In Demir and Baykara v Turkey
(2009), 48 EHRR 54, the ECtHR found that a government ban on collective bargaining violated the
right to freedom of association in Article 11 of the ECHR. The next year in Enerji Yeepi-Yol Sen v
Turkey App no 68959101 (ECtHr, 21 April 2009) the ECtHR held that the Turkish government's
prohibition on industrial action by public sector trade unions was found as well to breach Article 11
which was deemed to include protections on the right to strike. In other words, the ECtHR was taking
an expansive view of collective labour rights as fundamental ECHR human rights, in the face of the
CJEU's apparent view that such human rights are trumped by economic rights of Articles 49 and
56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Thus, a stalemate between key
European judicial institutions was established on notions of labour rights versus economic efficiency.
See also Bogg et al, supra note 1.
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1. Federal and provincial regulation of economic and labour markets:
Fragmented autonomies
Just as the words "labour and employment law" or the European notion
of "social law" do not appear in the Constitution Act, 1867, the words
"economic law" are also absent. The Fathers of Confederation in Canada
seem confidently to have assumed, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the
conditions of capitalism under the British Empire in the late Nineteenth
Century were a natural and inevitable part of the universe, Karl Marx
notwithstanding, and pace Charles Darwin.1 9 9 The founding fathers then
went about the distribution of powers as between the federal parliament
and the provincial legislatures in what, from a comparative perspective,
might seem to be a very literal and pragmatic fashion.2 0 0 Moreover, as
stated above, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which from
1867 to 1949 was the highest court of appeal for Canada, is generally
agreed to have "decentralized" Canadian confederation in ways contrary
to the expectations of the framers, who are often said to have had the
counter-example of the decentralized American constitution and the
American Civil War on their minds, when drafting what they thought were
strong central powers for what was then the "Dominion of Canada."2 0 1
Thus, while under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 the federal
Parliament was given legislative authority over "the regulation of trade and
commerce," that phrase has been restrictively interpreted by comparison
to the analogous phrase in the American constitution, by virtue of an
expansive interpretation of provincial legislative authority over "property
and civil rights" under section 92(13). There is also a prohibition on the
erection of provincial trade barriers, so that Canada constitutes a customs
union.20 2 The shift of economic and social authority to the provinces began
in 1881 with litigation in relation to the insurance industry,20 3 and since
that time "it has been accepted that, in general, intra-provincial trade and
commerce is a matter within provincial power...and the federal trade and
commerce power is confined to (1) interprovincial or international trade
199. Friedrich Hayek would perhaps have been comfortable at the Confederation table: see his Law,
Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles ofJustice and Political Economy
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).
200. Dennis Davis, Alan Richter & Cheryl Saunders, eds, An Inquiry into the Existence of Global
Values through the Lens of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015).
201. John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Alexander Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and
the United States (Toronto: Butterworths, 1963).
202. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 142, s 121. This was thought to be of limited application until
a recent case over inter-provincial beer purchases: see R v Comeau, 2016 NBPC 3. Leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada has been granted, 37398 (4 May 2017).
203. Citizens Insurance Co v Parsons (1881), 7 AC 96 (PC), aff'g (1880) 4 SCR 215.
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and commerce, and (2) "general trade and commerce."20 4 While federal
Parliament has specific authority over such structural economic matters as
navigation and shipping (now including aeronautics), currency ("money"
and "legal tender"), banking, weights and measures, bills of exchange and
promissory notes, interest, bankruptcy, patents, copyright, and immigration
(naturalization and aliens), and has the residual power to legislate for
the "peace, order and good government of Canada,"20 5 the expansive
judicial interpretation of provincial legislative authority over property and
civil rights has rendered Canada one of the world's most decentralized
federations.20 6 One of the most recent examples of this was the Supreme
Court's rejection in 2011 of an attempt by the federal government, after
years of public and private studies to say nothing of intense pressure from
economic interests, to create a federal securities regulation system which
would have given Canada a national capital market rather than the current
fragmented ones under provincial jurisdiction.20 7 The Court refused to
eviscerate provincial power over property and civil rights and declared the
legislation ultra vires the federal Parliament, although it did confirm the
existence of some limited federal authority in this context and suggested
that a national securities regulation system could be established by
agreement between the federal and provincial legislatures in an exercise
of cooperative federalism.2 0 8
Canadian observers are left with the common assumption, and indeed
the common law assumption, that "free enterprise" is the natural soil out
of which economic activity grows: private ownership of property, freedom
of contract, and a civil or private law which protects both, are part of
the air we breathe.2 09 Of course, social democracy of the post-WWII
era challenged these assumptions by creating a counterbalancing social
204. Hogg, supra note 146, ch 20 at 2.
205. The latter category being used to justify the invocation of federal legislative authority over such
subjects as competition or "anti-monopoly" law, sale of drugs, and environmental protection.
206. Davis, supra note 200.
207. Reference re SecuritiesAct, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837.
208. Currently this option is being pursued by some Canadian governments, in the face of staunch
opposition from Quebec and Alberta: The Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System,
Capital Markets Stability Act-Draft for Consultation (January 2016), online: <ccmr-ocrmc.ca>;
The Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, Memorandum of Agreement Regarding The
Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System (26 August 2014), online: <ccmr-ocrmc.ca>; Jon C
Truswell et al, "Alberta Confirms it Will Not Join Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System"
(31 March 2016), online: <bennettjones.com>. Quebec refuses to participate as well.
209. The notion that free enterprise is "unregulated" rather than regulated by the common law for
its promotion is very much contested terrain: see Simon Deakin, "Concepts of the Market in Labour
Law" in Ann Numhauser-Henning & Mia Ronmar, Normative Patterns and Legal Developments in
the Social Dimension ofthe EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 141.
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dimension to labour market regulation.2 10 Both federal and provincial
govemments contributed to the rise of the welfare state in Canada, and
such participation occurred through legislatures govemed at one time
or other by political parties of all stripes.211 Latterly, of course, both
Liberal and Conservative govemments at both federal and provincial
levels have championed the retrenchment of the welfare state through
reductions in govemment services and privatization, and even the rhetoric
of the NDP is of the "third way" sort,2 1 2 which does not challenge the
centrality of free enterprise and the market economy, and sensitivity to
"taxpayers" (as opposed to "citizens"?).213 These phenomena are given
greater impetus through globalization of trade and Canada's accession
to the North American Free Trade Agreement.214 The first point flowing
210. See Allan Moscovitch & Jim Albert, eds, The "Benevolent" State: the Growth of Welfare in
Canada (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987) and Thomas J Courchene, Social Canada in the Millennium:
Reform Imperatives and Restructuring Principles (Toronto: CD Howe Institute, 1994).
211. The Conservative Party or "Tories" were the party of Sir JohnA Macdonald, Canada's founding
Prime Minister, and predominated in the latter part of the nineteenth century, while in the twentieth
century the Liberals, of Whiggish origins, are seen by many as the predominant political force. Both
of these political formations were in effect centrist "brokerage" parties, and they often alternated in
power at both federal and provincial levels. The Great Depression of the 1930s led to the formation
of the rightist Social Credit Party (which governed in Alberta and British Columbia) and the social
democratic Cooperative Commonwealth Federation or "CCF" (which governed in Saskatchewan):
Seymour M Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in
Saskatchewan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). Social Credit has disappeared, while
the CCF transformed itself into the New Democratic Party (NDP), a labour-based social democratic
formation, in 1961. The NDP has formed governments in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, Ontario and Nova Scotia, but never federally, though it became the Official Opposition
in the federal Parliament in the last term of the Harper Conservative Government. The Conservative
Party is an amalgam of traditional conservatives and neo-liberal, western Reform Party members. It
was aggressively dismantling the welfare state at the federal level until the recent election of Justin
Trudeau's Liberals, who seem to be brandishing a version of neo-Keynsianism. Neoliberalism has
dominated certain provincial conservative and liberal parties at various times, but usually not the NDP.
In Quebec, of course, these left-right tensions are played out in the context of linguistic and cultural
dimensions which led to the rise of the separatist Parti Quebecois, its federal counterpart, the Bloc
Quebecois, and its provincial rightist splinter group, Coalition Avenir Quebec.
212. See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1998). Giddens, of course, was one of the key architects of Tony Blair's "third way"
policies as adopted by the British Labour Government.
213. Many observers attribute the resurgence of the Liberals under Justin Trudeau to the common
perception that the NDP under Tom Mulcair, advocating a balanced budget, was to the right of the
neo-Keynesian Liberals, a position at least one observer deemed a "surprise stance": see, e.g., "Tom
Mulcair says NDP's Balanced Budget Commitment was His Idea" CBC News (11 October 2015),
online: <cbc.ca>.
214. See AFL-CIO, NAFTA at 20 (2014), online: <www.aficio.org>; Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, Lessons From NAFTA: The High Cost of 'Free Trade' (2013), online: <www.
policyaltematives.ca>. Of course, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Canada-European
Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) are now in the cards, and the
Liberals look like conservative supporters of free trade, while the NDP are more firm opponents. The
Liberals, for example, signed the TPP agreement in Auckland, New Zealand on 4 February 2016, and
it is now waiting for parliamentary approval. The working text can be found online: <http://www.
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from these observations i to highlight the fact that in Canada the tensions
between regulation of a free enterprise market economy on the one hand,
and protective or capability liberating regulation of the social side of the
ledger on the other, are played out at both the federal and provincial levels.
Neither level has predominant control, other than arguably the federal
government in times of war or emergency.2 1 5 Moreover, the game has a
shifting cast of characters in terms of political and ideological leadership,
which has sometimes led to a rather balanced cooperative federalism,
or at other times, such as under the Harper Conservatives, to federal-
provincial stalemate.16 The second point is to drive home that Canada's
constitutional arrangements are built on liberal notions of a free enterprise
economy, but have allowed for varied regulation of the balance between
economic and social interests, in structures which allow for a broad degree
of autonomous action from both public and private actors and institutions.
This was the context for the introduction of the Charter in 1982, which
international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/index.aspx?lang=eng>.
Similarly, the government announced the completion of its legal review of the CETA on 29 February
2016, which is now under translation, and will then be reviewed for implementation into existing
regulatory frameworks: see the text of CETA online: <international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/index.aspx?lang=eng>. Commentators outside of the labour
movement have been equally critical of the TPP's potential impact on human rights, the limitations of
its potential gains, and its impact on the ability of governments to effectively legislate migration and
labour: see e.g. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, "UN expert urges
Pacific Rim countries not to sign the TPP without committing to human rights and development" (2
February 2016), online: <www.ohchr.org>; Dan Ciuriak, Ali Dadkhah & Jingliang Xiao, "Better In
than Out? Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership" (CD Howe Institute, 21 April 2016), online:
<cdhowe.org>; and Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood, "Migrant Workers and the Trans-Pacific Partnership:
ARegulatory Impact Analysis of the TPP's Temporary Entry Provisions" (Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, April 2016), online: < policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports>. All of this is now
water under the bridge since President Donald Trump's successful efforts to torpedo the TPP, though
the issues will arise in renegotiating NAFTA.
215. The federal War MeasuresAct (RSC 1985, c W-2, as repealed by the EmergenciesAct, RSC 1985,
c 22 (4th Supp), s 80) was invoked not only during WWII to regulate the war effort (including the
Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, PC 1003, (1944) 44:2 Labour Gaz 135 which introduced the
Wagner Act model of labour relations to Canada), but also during the "Quebec Crisis" of the 1970s, by
the Liberal government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, to respond to separatist terrorism (William
Tetley, October Crisis, 1970: An Insider 's View (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 2007)). The Reference reAnti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373, 68 DLR (3d) 452, however, did
recognize emergency conditions arising from other than war, and demonstrated adeferential approach
by Parliament to what was deemed an economic emergency in the early 1980s.
216. But it would appear the new Trudeau Liberals are making serious efforts to restore this
cooperative federalism, including in the area of labour regulations, see, e.g., Prime Minister Trudeau's
mandate letter to the Minister of Employment, Workforce Development and Labour, which states that
the overarching goal of the latter should include "working with provinces, territories, municipalities,
the post-secondary education system, employers and labour to strengthen [Canadian] training systems
to build the human capital that Canadians and employers need" in a "collaborative way": Office of
the Prime Minister, "Minister of Employment, Workforce Development and Labour Mandate Letter"
(Ottawa: 13 November 2015), online: < http://pm.gc.ca>.
50 The Dalhousie Law Journal
subtly, and sometimes not so subtly, changed the constitutional parameters
of regulatory autonomy among courts and legislatures in ways which have
recently taken some dramatic turns in relation to institutions of labour
market regulation.
2. Constitutional meta-rights and the framework for relatively
autonomous labour law
The Constitution Act, 1867 declared in its Preamble that the Dominion
of Canada is united "under the Crown of the United Kingdom" and with
"a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom." 2 17
For our purposes, this meant a system of responsible parliamentary
government with the cabinet answering to the legislature, and with federal
and provincial legislative sovereignty within the constitutional division of
powers,2 18 with no overarching "bill of rights."2 19 Under the Constitution
Act, 1982,220 a constitutionally entrenched Charter ofRights and Freedoms,
binding on all levels of government was adopted.2 21 The Charter declares
the existence of fundamental freedoms (including conscience and religion;
thought, belief, opinion and expression; freedom of assembly; and
freedom of association);2 2 2 democratic rights;2 23 mobility rights (including
the rights to reside in or gain a livelihood in any province, and economic
affirmative action programs);2 24 legal rights (including rights to life,
liberty and security of the person and not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with principles of fundamental justice);2 25 equality rights;22 6
language rights;2 27 and French and English minority educational rights.2 28
The Constitution Act, 1982 also affirms the rights of aboriginal peoples.229
In addition, it introduced governmental "commitments" to the promotion
of equal opportunities for economic well-being and development, and to
217. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 142.
218. There is in principle a federal power of disallowance which has long since fallen into desuetude.
219. Canadian Bill ofRights, SC 1960, c 44. In 1960, the federal Parliament passed this "Diefenbaker
Bill of Rights," which was applicable within the federal legislative sphere only, and amounted to an
enhanced interpretation act.
220. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution
Act, 1982].
221. Charter, supra note 18. This, of course, was accomplished by the "Imperial Parliament"
in Westminster, at the request of the Government of Canada-an action which was the subject of
constitutional challenge from the government of the Province of Quebec.
222. Ibid, s2.
223. Ibid, ss 3-5.
224. Ibid, s6.
225. Ibid, ss 7-14.
226. Ibid, s 15.
227. Ibid, ss 16-22.
228. Ibid, s23.
229. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 220, ss 35-35.1.
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reasonably comparable vels of essential public services.2 3 0 An interesting
omission from this list, from the perspective of economic regulation, is the
absence of a constitutional recognition of property rights or right to engage
in commerce per se.23 1 The Charter mobility right to "gain a livelihood" has
been held to allow a person to move to another province for the purpose of
the delivery of services,2 3 2 but subject to general provincial regulations on
how a business or occupation is to be carried out or licensed. This includes
labour standards regulation and systems of collective bargaining. The
mobility rights provision would appear not to disrupt previous holdings
that non-residents of a province can be restricted in their rights to hold
real estate.2 3 3 Moreover, the mobility rights provisions do not apply to
corporations, which in principle could be prevented by a province from
carrying on business there. It would appear that the movement of capital
may be protected by the right to gain a living in another province if it is
integral to an individual's establishment here,2 3 4 but as mentioned above,
there is no federal power to regulate securities issuance, and provincial
legislation can create significant barriers to the mobility of capital in
Canada. In addition, the legal right to security of the person in Charter
has been held not to impose on governments in Canada a positive right
to provide welfare benefits to those without other sources of income.235
The upshot, in general, is that the Charter has not had a significant direct
impact on the regulation of economic rights or the regulation of economic
markets in Canada.2 3 6
An interesting exception to the conclusion that the Charter does not
have a significant impact on "personal work relations" arose with respect
to the sex trade. In Bedford v. Canada,2 3 7 the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the Criminal Code provisions prohibiting the keeping of a common
bawdy house, living on the avails of prostitution and communicating in
public for the purposes of prostitution imposed unacceptable risks on
those in the sex trade which constituted a breach of their Charter right to
230. Ibid, s 36.
231. Property rights were included, for example, in the aforementioned Canadian Bill of Rights,
supra note 219 s 1(a), which states the right of every individual to "life, liberty, security of the person,
and enjoyment of property."
232. Black v Law Society ofAlberta, [1989] 1 SCR 591, 58 DLR (4th) 317.
233. Morgan v Prince Edward Island (AG), [1976] 2 SCR 349, 55 DLR (3d) 527.
234. Hogg, supra note 146, ch 46 at 14.
235. Gosselin v Quebec, 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR 429 [Gosselin], dealing with rights under a
"workfare" programme.
236. Indeed corporations, for example, have been held not to enjoy the same Charter protections as
natural persons: Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (AG), [1989] 1 SCR 927, 58 DLR (4th) 557.
237. Bedford v Canada (AG), 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101.
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security of the person. At the time, selling sexual services was not illegal.2 3 8
The impugned provisions of the Criminal Code were declared to be of
no force or effect since they breached the section 7 rights of prostitutes
to security of the person in a manner not consistent with principles of
fundamental justice, and which could not be saved by section 1 of the
Charter This case illustrates an important general methodological aspect
of the Canadian Charter, namely the nature of the general imitation clause
found in section 1. That provision states that the rights and freedoms of
the Charter are "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
The Supreme Court of Canada in the early days of the Charter held that
this section was to be interpreted and applied as involving a two-step
process:23 9 (1) Is there a "pressing and substantial legislative objective"
or "purpose" in a governmental action prescribed by law which warrants
overriding a Charter right or freedom?; and (2) Is the means used to
achieve the purpose proportional? Under the second step, the adequacy of
proportionality is to be assessed on three separate dimensions: (a) Is the
limiting law rationally connected to its objective? (b) Does the limiting
law impair the right or freedom as little as reasonably possible? and (c) Is
there overall "proportionality between the deleterious and salutary effects
of the measures"?2 40
In Bedford, the Criminal Code provisions were found to have a
disproportionate impact on the right to security of the person. However,
the general impact of section 1 in relation to constitutionally protected
labour rights or freedoms is that they can be limited by legislative,
governmental or judicial action which have a pressing and substantial
purpose or objective, and where the means used to attain the objective ar
proportional along the three dimensions just mentioned. In other words,
Charter section 1 can be used to override labour rights and thus limit the
autonomy of labour law in a relatively open-ended process. As will be
seen below, pressing and substantial economic and social interests can
be invoked to limit Charter-protected labour rights as long as the means
used are proportional. Needless to say, this is contested terrain. But it does
indicate that, in Canada, there is a unified field of legal battle where the
238. Since this decision, Parliament has criminalized the purchasing, but not the offering for sale,
of sexual services. The constitutional validity of this purportedly Scandinavian "punish the johns"
approach has yet to be litigated. See especially Criminal Code, supra note 92, ss 2, 286.1, 286.2,
286.3, 286.4, 286.5.
239. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 53 OR (2d) 719. There follows a description of what is commonly
called "the Oakes test."
240. The Oakes test has generated a huge jurisprudence. This formulation of the third proportionality
dimension was articulated by Lamer CJ inDagenais, supra note 18 at 889.
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Supreme Court of Canada is the normal sole arbiter of the contest.24 1 As
will be seen below, at least in the area of collective labour relations, the
kind of institutional stand-off which one sees in Europe between the CJEU
and the ECtHR in the post-Viking/Laval era can be resolved in Canada,
with a clear understanding that the autonomy of labour law in relation
to other potential economic and social concerns can only be a relative
autonomy, conditioned by the constitutional limitation clause.
3. Collective rights, individual rights and relative autonomy in
Canadian labour market regulation
Recent Canadian case law on freedom of association has led to the
constitutionalization of certain collective bargaining rights and the right
to strike in four important decisions since 2007, subject of course to
proportional limitations. Meanwhile, there is little or no constitutional
protection for the employment standards rights of individuals, and this
state of affairs is reinforced by a fifth "anti-freedom of association" case
in 2015. This is because the new constitutional jurisprudence based on
freedom of association is said to extend to procedural rights only, rather
than to any substantive outcomes-a dichotomy which has important
implications, but which may be difficult to sustain. The relative autonomy
of collective bargaining is thus constitutionally enhanced, while the relative
autonomy of common law, and other statutory protections or limitations,
is less robust and appears vulnerable to unstable changes in the political
climate, unless new constitutional arguments emerge. These developments
will be summarized and briefly assessed.
a. Freedom ofassociation and Canada 's new constitutionalized collective
bargaining rights
During the mid-1980s, in a series of cases known as the "Labour Law
Trilogy (plus One),"24 2 the Supreme Court of Canada essentially held that
freedom of association is an individual right to join together to achieve
241. There is, of course, the legislative over-ride provision, with a sunset clause of a maximum of five
years, in s 33 of the Charter supra note 18. This "notwithstanding clause," while it does not apply to
democratic and mobility rights, does apply to freedom of association under s 2(d), legal rights under
s 7, and equality rights under s 15. Outside Quebec, the provision has only been used three times (by
Saskatchewan, Yukon and Alberta). One of those was in relation to back to work legislation in the
Saskatchewan: The SGEUDispute SettlementAct, SS 1984-85-86, c 111, s 9. However, that legislation
was passed before the recent freedom of association cases from the Supreme Court of Canada to be
discussed below.
242. Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 SCR 313, 38 DLR
(4th) 161 [Alberta Reference]; PSAC v Canada, [1987] 1 SCR 424, 38 DLR (4th) 249; andRWDSU
v Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 SCR 460, 38 DLR (4th) 277 constitute the "trilogy." The "plus" was
Professional Institute ofthe Public Service ofCanada vNorthwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990]
2 SCR 367, 72 DLR (4th) 1 [PIPSC1.
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common purposes, but that particular purposes would not be given specific
constitutional protection. Thus, it was held that while workers have the
right to join unions, the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike
were not constitutionally protected aspects of freedom of association.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers were therefore denied
the right to full and independent collective bargaining in 1999 on the
grounds that their associational rights would be sufficient to protect such
a professional group in their discussions with the government.2 4 3 This
controversial view held sway, under the brunt of scholarly criticism,2 44
until a crack appeared in 2001. The Supreme Court of Canada then said
that vulnerable agricultural workers, statutorily excluded from the right
to bargain collectively under Ontario's Labour Relations Act,245 had a
constitutional right o make collective representations to their employer and
be protected from reprisals from the employer for so doing, since, unlike
RCMP officers, they did not have the wherewithal to bargain collectively
without legislative support.24 6 The failure to provide these agricultural
workers with aspects of a collective bargaining regime was said to be a
breach of their right to freedom of association which could not be justified
under the limitation clause. The finding that agricultural workers should
be afforded some relatively undefined protection parallel to the standard
Wagner Act collective bargaining scheme indicated a degree of respect
from the Court for the autonomous regime typical of Canadian labour law
which involved a notion of collective rights. However, the reasoning of the
court in Dunmore was very circumscribed and gave no real indication of
what was to come.
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada repudiated the reasoning
which had underpinned the Labour Trilogy cases, and held that the right
to collective bargaining was a protected aspect of freedom of association.
The matter arose when British Columbia passed legislation i tended to
reduce costs and increase fficiency in the publicly-funded health care
system. The legislation, which was enacted without consultations with
health care unions, rolled back previously negotiated protections against
contracting out of health care services and, among other things, allowed
for lay-offs which ignored seniority and bumping rights under existing
243. Delisle v Canada (DeputyAttorney General), [1999] 2 SCR 989, 176 DLR (4th) 513.
244. Dianne Pothier, "Twenty Years of Labour Law and the Charter" (2002) 40:3 Osgoode Hall U
369.
245. Labour Relations Act, supra note 69, Schedule A.
246. Dunmore v Ontario (AG), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 SCR 1016, Bastarache J for the majority
[Dunmore].
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collective agreements.2 4 7 The Charter right to freedom of association
was said to include the "right to collective bargaining on fundamental
workplace issues," but not a right to any particular system of collective
bargaining. It was said to "guarantee a process rather than an outcome."2 4 8
However, collective bargaining was also said to necessarily imply a duty
on employers to negotiate in good faith with a representative union.2 49 The
right to freedom of association was said to have been breached because
the legislation "substantially interfered with collective bargaining" and the
provisions were not salvageable under Charter section 1. The government's
concerns about costs and efficiency in the health care sector, while pressing
and substantial, were not treated in a proportional manner given the
substantial impact of the legislation on collective bargaining. The majority
reasoned that collective bargaining was a historically significant and
accepted form of freedom of association in Canada, that it was consistent
with democratic values, and that it reflected obligations to which Canada
had subscribed as a matter of international law.2 50 The immediate effect
of the B.C. Health Services case was that governments across the country
tightened up on statutory exclusions to collective bargaining regimes25 1
and became nervous about the possibility of a constitutionalized right o
strike and its impact on essential public services. Private-sector employers
were also alarmed. The Court, however, had stated explicitly in B.C.
Health Services that it was not addressing the question of whether the
right to strike was a constitutionalized aspect of freedom of association.25 2
Nonetheless, the importance of autonomous collective bargaining had
been strongly endorsed by the Court.
247. Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007
SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 [BC Health].
248. Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1 at para 67,
380 DLR (4th) 1 [MPAO].
249. A controversial claim about a reciprocal duty based on the Wagner Act statutory model, but
certainly not part of the traditional common law: see Brian Langille, "Why the Right-Freedom
Distinction Matters to Labour Lawyers-And to All Canadians" (2011) 34:1 Dal U 143 [Langille,
"Right-Freedom Distinction"].
250. The validity and strength of these propositions has been a matter of controversy: Brian
Etherington, "Does the Freedom of Association under the Charter Include the Right to Strike after
B.C. Health? Prognosis, Problems and Concerns" (2009-2010) 15:2 CLELJ 315; BrianLangille, "The
Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got into It and How We Can Get out of It" (2009) 54:1 McGill
U 177 [Langille, "Mess"].
251. In Nova Scotia, for example, classifications of employees excluded from public sector collective
bargaining were brought into the fold, and certain issues excluded from public sector collective
bargaining were put onto the table, as it were: see Civil Service Collective BargainingAct, RS 1989, c
71. See also Civil Service Act, RSM 1987, c C110; Public ServicesAct, RSQ 2009, c F-3.1.1.
252. The right to strike was not in issue in the case because of essential services legislation in BC,
which was not being challenged at the time.
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Ontario v. Fraser, 253 the next case to go to the Supreme Court of Canada
on freedom of association, was a second round on agricultural workers.
Despite the opening provided by Dunmore, the Ontario legislature did not
simply remove the exclusion provision for agricultural workers from the
Labour Relations Act,254 but rather enacted the Agricultural Employees
Protection Act 2002, which established a separate system for agricultural
employees, doing the minimum possible in accordance with the Dunmore
reasoning.255 Agricultural workers were given a statutory right to form "an
employees association" and to "make representation to their employers,"
but the duty on the employer was merely to listen to oral or read written
representations from the association and to acknowledge that any written
representations had been read.256 On its face, the act put no duty on the
employer to make reasonable efforts to negotiate and sign a collective
agreement. The act gave jurisdiction over dispute resolution to an
agricultural tribunal which had authority over a number of agricultural
matters, but was not specialized in labour relations. The act was challenged
by a workers' association (affiliated with a national union), but the claims
were denied at first instance in a decision that was rendered before the
issuance of the B. C. Health Services case. In the Ontario Court of Appeal,
the legislation was struck down by virtue of its failure to impose a duty
to bargain on the employer, failure to provide for certification of an
exclusive bargaining agent, and failure to create access to authoritative
dispute resolution processes.257 Chief Justice Winkler, a former labour
relations lawyer of high repute, relied upon B. C. Health Services as a
precedent, but was criticized by some for "constitutionalizing the Wagner
Act model,"258 which was explicitly not mandated in B. C. Health Services.
When Fraser reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court split
badly. Justice Abella would have upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal
reasoning. Justices Rothstein and Charron declared in lengthy reasons that
B.C. Health Services was both wrongly decided and misguided, and that
the new legislation should be upheld on the assumption that the notion
of the consitutionalization of collective bargaining should be reversed.
The majority confirmed that B. C. Health Services was good law, but was
unwilling to strike down the agricultural legislation. The majority held
that, in order to be constitutionally valid per B.C. Health Services, the
253. Fraser, supra note 60.
254. Labour Relations Act, supra note 69, Schedule A.
255. Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 16 [AEPA].
256. AEPA, ibid, s 5.
257. Fraser v Ontario (AG), 2008 ONCA 760, 92 OR (3d) 481.
258. Langille, "Right-Freedom Distinction," supra note 249.
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legislation must be interpreted to impose a duty on the employer to bargain
in good faith, and to impose upon the agricultural tribunal a duty to vindicate
the association's constitutional rights to bargain collectively, should the
association make application before it-all this, despite the literal wording
of the Act, which did not explicitly mandate these requirements. Fraser
was welcomed by some who approved of its flexibility2 5 9 and criticized by
others who felt the majority had undermined labour rights by upholding
the legislation.2 6 0 The agricultural workers apparently did not have
sufficient confidence in the agricultural tribunal (or perhaps the resources
or stamina) to continue the litigation. But the decision has been cited, by
the Nova Scotia Labour Board at least, as authority for labour tribunals to
give a broad and purposive interpretation to labour relations legislation for
the purpose of upholding the constitutional collective bargaining rights of
employees.2 6 1 A positive view of the decision might be that it reinforces
possibilities within the labour relations sphere for creative administrative
decision-making in a constitutionally autonomous space.
The next decision of note is a second round on the issue of collective
bargaining between the RCMP and its management. In the wake of Delisle
in 1999 there was a continuation of RCMP personnel's exclusion from
the bargaining regimes for federal public servants. Pursuant o regulations
under the RCMP Act, RCMP management established a "Staff Relations
Representative Program" as the sole mechanism for dealing with labour
relations issues, although it excluded discussion of wages. Representatives
of civilian and uniformed RCMP staff were elected at all levels of the
RCMP hierarchy to liaise on human relations and personnel questions,
but decision-making authority resided solely with management. The
Mounted Police Association of Ontario challenged this scheme in the light
of B.C. Health Services and Fraser2 6 2 The Supreme Court of Canada, in a
decision split along familiar lines, held the Staff Relations Representative
Program to be unconstitutional.2 6 3 The majority declared that "freedom
259. Roy J Adams, "Bewilderment and Beyond: A Comment on the Fraser Case" (2012) 16:2 CLELJ
313.
260. Alan Bogg & Keith Ewing, "A (Muted) Voice at Work? Collective Bargaining in the Supreme
Court of Canada" (2012) 33:3 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 379; BrianLangille & Benjamin Oliphant, "From
the Frying Pan into the Fire: Fraser and the Shift from International Law to International 'Thought' in
Charter Cases" (2011) 16:2 CLELJ 181; see also Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, supra note
144.
261. Egg Films, supra note 84. See also Re Metro Community Living Support Services Ltd and
NSGEU, 2015 NSLB 87, rev'd Metro Community Living Support Services Ltd v Nova Scotia (Labour
Board), 2016 NSSC 123. Once again, it mustbe disclosed that the present author chaired the panel of
the Board in that case.
262. MPAO, supra note 248.
263. Justice Rothstein delivered the sole dissent, in which he held that the freedom of association
58 The Dalhousie Law Journal
of association protects a meaningful process of collective bargaining that
provides employees with a degree of choice and independence sufficient
to enable them to determine and pursue their collective interests."264 In that
light, the majority in MPAO held that "the current RCMP labour relations
regime denies RCMP members that choice, and imposes on them a
scheme that does not permit them to identify and advance their workplace
concerns free from management's influence."265 In a certain way, this is to
constitutionalize a doctrine familiar to the Wagner Act model that, in order
to be certified, a union must be free from employer influence in order to be
able to carry out its representative functions under the legislation.266 The
Court went to some lengths to re-assert hat it is not "constitutionalizing
the Wagner Act model," but one might wonder how all this will play
out in the context of pressures for more cooperative labour relations in
a globalized world.267 Moreover, the Court's reflections on the necessary
democratic characteristics of unions may be perceived as a possible degree
of interference in their internal constitutional affairs, where Canadian law
has historically had a hands-off approach concerning union, as opposed
to corporate, constitutions.268 However, advocates of a human capability
development approach may take comfort in the Court's affirmation of a
"generous approach" to the interpretation of freedom of association which
in the words of the majority is "centred on the purpose of encouraging
the individual's self-fulfillment and the collective realization of human
does not necessarily mandate an adversarial process in the historical vein of the Wagner Act model:
MPAO, ibid at para 205. This was a similar divide to that in Fraser, supra note 60, where Rothstein
and Charron JJ concurred in the result, but disagreed with the majority that the freedom of association
necessarily confers a right to bargain collectively or a duty on employers to meet with employees in
good faith for such purposes. The justices argued that BC Health was wrongly decided in this respect
on several grounds (paras 172-175).
264. MPAO, supra note 248 at para 5. The majority decision, written by McLachlin CJC and Lebel J
was concurred inby Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
265. Ibid.
266. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, supra note 78, ss 25 and 53.
267. See, e.g., the 2007 case of the Canadian Auto Workers renouncing its right to strike in return
for unopposed access to the Canadian plants of the employer, Magna International. To effect this,
both parties signed a "Framework of Fairness" document which included internal dispute resolution
mechanisms: see Porter Heffernan, "Democracy in a Cooperative Labour Relations Paradigm?
The CAW, Magna, and the Framework of Fairness" (LLM Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2008)
[unpublished]. The agreement led to controversy and heated disagreement between CAW and other
major actors in the labour movement such as the United Steelworkers and the Service Employees
International Union: Wayne Fraser et al, "The Magna Sell-out," The National Post (23 November
2007), online: <cupe.onca>. The United Steelworkers even made an unsuccessful bid for certification
at the plant after the agreement was announced: Carl Bronski, "Canada: Steelworkers and CAW
Officials Tussle Over Dues Base at Magna," International Committee of the Fourth International
(6 September 2008), online: <wsws.org>.
268. Michael MacNeil, Michael Lynk & Peter Engelmann, Trade Union Law in Canada (Aurora:
Canada Law Book, 1994) (loose-leaf release 33, 2016), ch 4 at 1-7; compare Berry, supra note 106.
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goals, consistent with democratic values," as informed by "the historical
origins of the concepts enshrined."2 6 9 In addition, the Court was at pains
to point out appropriate collective dimensions to rights discourse in the
context of freedom of association, which is something of a controversial
innovation.2 7 0 There seems to be an implicit correlation between the
outcome of this case and a notion of the relative autonomy of labour law,
but the full implications of the decision have yet to be teased out.
In the fourth recent decision from the Supreme Court on freedom
of association, the Court takes the plunge into the turbulent waters of
re-assessing the right to strike. In what is known as the Saskatchewan
Federation of Labour case,2 7 1 the Court rejected the final anachronistic
aspect of the Labour Trilogy, and found that the right to strike is an integral
part of the constitutional right to collective bargaining. However, as one
might anticipate, it was not without an important analysis of the limitations
which may be place on this right pursuant o section 1 of the Charter The
context was a challenge to Saskatchewan essential services legislation
which took away the right to strike in a large number of public and para-
public workplaces. The legislation in question prohibited strike action by
"designated employees," and required them to keep working under any
prior collective agreement. The Court first held that
[t]he right to strike is not merely derivative of collective bargaining, it is
an indispensable component ofthat right... Where good faith negotiations
break down, the ability to engage in the collective withdrawal of services
is a necessary component of the process through which workers can
continue to participate meaningfully in the pursuit of their collective
workplace goals.2 7 2
However, it then held that "[t]he unilateral authority of public employers
to determine whether and how essential services are to be maintained
during a work stoppage with no adequate review mechanism, and
the absence of a meaningful dispute resolution mechanism to resolve
bargaining impasses, justify the... conclusion that the [legislation is not
minimally impairing] "273 The essential services legislation thus infringed
the Charter right to freedom of association and could not be saved as
269. MPAO, supra note 248 at para 46.
270. The dissent took a dim view of this approach, as noted, supra note 263.
271. Saskatchewan Federation ofLabour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 SCR 245 [SFL].
The numbers of intervenors were legion. The majority decision from 5 judges was writtenby Abella J,
and there were dissenting reasons form Rothstein and Wagner JJ. The decision was rendered in March,
following MPAO, supra note 252 and Meredith, infra note 272, both rendered in February.
272. SFL, supra note 271 atpara 3, 75.
273. Ibid at para 81.
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proportional under section 1. The Court was also clear in its view that
the right to strike promotes equality. There is a good deal of fascinating
analysis in this decision which cannot be reviewed within the confines
of this article. However several points ought to be stressed. The first is
that essential services legislation of the "designation" type is not the
only, or necessarily the most significant, context in Canada for legislative
limitations on the right to strike. Ad hoc back-to-work legislation, usually
introduced on the eve or in the middle of a strike, is a relatively frequent
occurrence in Canada, but it is usually accompanied by interest arbitration
as the mechanism for resolving the bargaining impasse between the
parties.274 The absence of interest arbitration in Saskatchewan Federation
of Labour was cited by the Court as a reason why the legislation could
not be saved as "minimally impairing" under section 1 of the Charter
However, interest arbitration is controversial since it is often criticized
for its narcotic and chilling effects on collective bargaining and for its
purported tendency to award more to unions/employees than the employer
might have done if strikes and lockouts were allowed.2 7 5 This is a situation
where the rationality or rationale and the relative autonomy of labour law
clash with certain perceived imperatives of Canadian politics.
The upshot of the four cases above was that the constitutionalization
of collective bargaining rights was given an immunizing shot in the arm.
The Supreme Court of Canada seemed to be going down the same road
as the European Court of Human Rights in recognizing a robust form of
collective bargaining, including the right to strike, as a constitutionally
protected aspects of freedom of association. However, on the same day that
the Supreme Court issued MPAO, it released a companion case brought by
two RCMP officers on behalf of their colleagues. This case brought forth
no accolades from the labour movement, and garnered little attention in
the press. That freedom of association case will, for reasons to become
apparent, be discussed in the next section.
b. The limited opportunity for constitutional rights litigation in
individually regulated employment
The foregoing concentration on dramatic Canadian constitutional rights
litigation that has an impact on collective labour market regulation can draw
attention away from other needs and concerns. One of those mentioned
above is the inefficacy of labour standards legislation in the non-unionized
sector. The effective regulation of this sector, in the interests of equality
274. See text above corresponding to footnotes 172 to 175, supra.
275. See Robert Hebdon & Maurice Mazerolle, "Regulating Conflict in Public Sector Labour
Relations" (2003) 58:4 RI 667.
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and efficiency, and in accordance with restorative values that enhance
capability development, is particularly important when union density is
falling, and when an ever increasing proportion of the workforce has no
access to the protections of collective bargaining. Litigation extending the
scope of freedom of association to include collective bargaining and the
right to strike is of little value to the bulk of those engaged in various other
forms of personal work relations. In other words, the domain of what in
North America is referred to as employment law continues to be collective
labour law's "little sister" or perhaps "poor cousin."276 This despite the
fact that human rights litigation over discrimination in the workplace
has had a variety of positive impacts and raised awareness about the
need for inclusive work environments and those which will not condone
bullying and abuse of various sorts.2 7 7 In the best of worlds, employment
law might be governed by a politics based on an electorate attuned to the
importance of human capability development, aware of the pro-efficiency
aspects of integrated labour market regulation, and prepared to reject
the rhetoric of the race to the bottom from an economically stressed or
ideologically short-sighted entrepreneurial class.27 8 In the absence of such
political enlightenment, social and labour activists in western democracies
have often turned to courts and tribunals to advance restorative aspects
of labour market regulation. However, are there Canadian prospects for
constitutional test case litigation which can promote capability enhancing
movements in the regulation of the non-unionized sector of the labour
market?
The short answer to the foregoing question is "not likely." As noted
by Brian Langille, the equality provisions in section 15 of the Charter
of Rights have been confined by an "anti-discrimination" interpretation,
which effectively prevents their use for the general promotion of social
276. See Judy Fudge, "Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law's Little Sister
and the Feminization of Labour" (1997) 7 JL & Soc Pol'y 73.
277. For a discussion on the significance of human rights legislation in the workplace, see Canadian
Human Rights Commission, The Right to be Different: Human Rights in Canada-An Assessment,
(Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 1988). Human rights tribunals have considered
discrimination in the workplace on a number of grounds: see, e.g., McKinnon v Ontario (Ministry
of Correctional Services) (No 3) (1988), OHRBID No 10 (race); Meiorin, supra note 141 (gender);
Johnstone v Canada Border Services, [2010] CHRD No 20 (family status); Shuswap Lake Hospital v
British Columbia Nurses' Union (Lockie Grievance) (2002), BCCAAA No 21 (disability); Laessoe v
Air Canada (1996), [1996] CHRD No 10 (sexual orientation).
278. On capability development, see generally Langille, "Labour Law's Theory of Justice," supra
note 28; Sen, supra note 29; Langille, "Labour Policy," supra note 33; Deakin, "Contribution of
Labour," supra note 37; Archibald, "Rights at Work," supra note 103. For an alternative view of the
significance of the race to the bottom, see Hepple, supra note 37.
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and economic equality.279 This seems rooted in the same fears which
have prevented Charter section 7's "security of the person" from being
interpreted as a right to security against economic need. Canadian courts
see such basic distributional questions as political rather than legal.280 Many
scholars see such social and economic issues as non-justiciable because they
are "appropriately within the legislative domain."281 Others, seemingly in
the minority, disagree.282 Nor does section 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982
with its "commitments" to "promoting equal opportunity for the wellbeing
of Canadians," "furthering economic development to reduce disparity
in economic opportunity" and "providing essential public services of
reasonable quality to all Canadians" provide comfort in this regard.283
These sections, drafted in the early 1980s like the Charter, may have had a
plausible ring in the dying days of the welfare state, but they too have been
deemed non-justiciable by legal commentators,284 and were ignored by the
Harper federal government which largely rejected the fundamental notion
of cooperative federalism on which they are based.285 The current federal
government seems more ideologically open to such concepts, which are
not unlike those found in the European Social Charter.28 6 At any rate,
successful constitutional litigation in the interests of promoting human
capability development and equality as the basis of labour standards
regulation seems a dim prospect. There appears at the moment to be no
justiciable right to decent work in Canada.287
The foregoing cautionary assessment of the constitutional prospects
for substantive rights to certain labour standards may be thought to be
reinforced by the case called Meredith,288 issued on the same day as MPAO
and a month before Saskatchewan Federation ofLabour. In Meredith there
were complex facts relating to RCMP labour management consultations
over wages and working conditions, and the applicability of the federal
Expenditure Restraint Act289 to the subjects of these discussions. The
279. Langille, "Mess," supra note 247 at 205.
280. Gosselin, supra note 235.
281. Hogg, supra note 146, ch 36 at 20.3-21.
282. John Whyte, "Fundamental Justice: The Scope and Application of Section 7 of the Charter"
(1983) 13:4 Man LJ 455; Joel Bakan & David Schneiderman, eds, SocialJustice and the Constitution:
Perspectives on a Social Union for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992).
283. Constitution Act 1982, supra note 220.
284. See Hogg, supra note 146.
285. Douglas M Brown, "Integration, Equity and Section 36" (2007) 37:1 SCLR 285.
286. European Social Charter (revised), 3 May 1996, ETS 163.
287. This is, of course, contested terrain globally: see Virginia Mantouvalou, ed, The Right to Work:
Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015).
288. Meredith v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 2, [2015] 1 SCR 125 [Meredith].
289. Expenditure RestraintAct, SC 2009, c 2, s 393 [ERA].
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RCMP's Pay Council Recommendations for wage increases of 3/3/2%
in 2008 for the next three years were knocked back to about 1. 5% per
year by the Treasury Board in accordance with the ERA, which applied
to the whole federal public sector. Meredith and another RCMP officer
challenged the 2009 ERA as violating their section 2(d) rights, since the
government as employer rolled back wages without adequate consultation
as required by B.C. Health Services. The trial judge held that the ERA
made it effectively impossible to negotiate in good faith with Treasury
Board, and that this breach of Charter section 2(d) rights to freedom of
association could not be justified under section 1. The Federal Court of
Appeal, and the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, then held that
the ERA did not "substantially interfere" with RCMP associational activity
and consultation, even if that system was concurrently struck down in
MPAO.
The Supreme Court majority in Meredith said that while the ERA
limited substantive outcomes on compensation related issues, RCMP
employees had still pursued some collective goals in a process that was
conducted in good faith. Even in dissent, Abella J. said that the problem
was merely insufficient consultation, rather than accepting the appellant's
arguments that legislating wage controls interfered with the constitutional
right to bargain collectively. In this nuanced judgment, the Court made
no clear statement that all wage restraint is constitutional, and affirmed
that governmental interference with such a fundamental condition of
employment must clearly leave room for a collective bargaining process on
both wage and non-wage bargaining issues.290 A cynic might argue that the
upshot of this case is that as long as the public sector employer maintains
open discussions with a union, that is respects the union's procedural right
to discussion and its own duty to "bargain in good faith," the government
which holds the purse strings will be able to legislate whatever it believes
to be in the interest of the public (aka "taxpayers") in terms of wage
constraints.29 1 Will further litigation be required to determine where the
Supreme Court might draw the line between procedural and substantive
290. This opening is exploited by a recent case from Ontario, where the court found that none of the
three rationales given in Meredith to justify interference with the freedom of association were present:
OPSEUv Ontario (Minister ofEducation), 2016 ONSC 2197 at paras 159-161.
291. This certainly appeared to be the case in Nova Scotia under recent legislation imposing public
sector wage restraints on both the public sector employers and public sector unions: Public Services
Sustainability (2015) Act, SNS 2015, c 34. Notably, the legislation was introduced by the Finance and
Treasury Board Minister, Randy Delorey, rather than by the Minister of Labour, Kelly Regan, thereby
attempting to reinforce the notion that the Government's actions were in the public ("taxpayers"')
interest and not simply a matter of an unjustifiable incursion upon the associational rights of public
sector employees.
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rights in this context? The conclusion might be that there is a good deal
of procedural autonomy in terms of collective bargaining, but that a
legislature's substantive assessment of the public interest on "affordable"
labour standards may trump a robust understanding of the ambit collective
bargaining. The scope of relative autonomy of labour and employment in
Canadian constitutional terms is clearly an evolving politico-legal project.
Conclusion
"Autonomy"-from the Greek auto (self) + nomos (law). Certainly
Canadian labour law is not a "law unto itself," given the continuing role
of the common law of employment regulated by the general courts, the
prevalence of statute-based regulation from legislatures, and the strong
influence of fundamental constitutional principles imposed by the Supreme
Court of Canada, at least in the unionized sector of the labour market.
There is, nonetheless, a relatively high degree of functional autonomy in
the values, rules and institutions of Canadian legal regulation of labour
markets, and there has been for some time. Canadian common law has
recognized that the contracts of employment must be governed by rules
other than those of commercial contract, given their relational nature
and the inequalities of bargaining power between the parties. Statutory
regimes for the governance of both unionized and non-union sectors
are largely under the authority of specialized and expert administrative
tribunals, which are given deference through administrative law by the
general courts. These labour tribunals, whether interpreting statutes
(labour boards) or collective agreements (arbitrators) have been granted
broad jurisdiction to interpret and apply common law, statutory and
constitutional principles, out of which they are capable of fashioning rules
with remedies applicable to the changing conditions of post-globalization
labour market conditions. This relative autonomy, given the decentralized
and fragmented nature of jurisdictional law-making authority under the
constitutional division of powers, has been exercised in different ways in
different provinces and jurisdictions, providing a living laboratory for the
creation of alternative solutions to problems in labour market regulation.
Implicit and even explicit recognition of the notion of the "personal work
relation" can be observed, which may provide openings for labour market
regulation based on restorative values of equality, dignity, mutual respect
and concern, as well as efficiency, productivity and flex-stability.
There are mixed responses to labour market segmentation
(casualization and disguised employment) as well as to the horizontal and
vertical dis-integration, or fissuring, of production by employers (various
"common employer" doctrines). Labour dispute resolution has taken on
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restorative characteristics through the expansion of such processes as
mediation-arbitration and restorative workplace conferencing. Labour
and employment "super-boards" may have the potential to encourage
integrated labour market regulation in both unionized and non-union
sectors. The recent recognition by the Supreme Court of Canada of
collective bargaining rights and the right to strike as constitutionalized
aspects of freedom of association seems simultaneously to be an assertion
of broad general authority by the judiciary, while at the same time giving
pluralistic room to those in the collective bargaining sector to stretch
within a semi-autonomous space-even if within limits. By times, there
is recognition by the institutions governing labour law that integrated and
restorative labour market regulation, in the interests of human capability
development, can be of benefit to all and could be within our grasp, under
the right conditions. The problems, of course, are daunting. But it might be
argued that the relatively autonomous tatus of labour law in Canada may
constitute a significant bulwark against he kind of non-liberal democratic
political pressures and populist deconstruction of worker rights which
seem to be on the rise elsewhere.292
292. See Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires behind the Rise of the
Radical Right (New York: Doubleday, 2016); and Mark Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political
Reaction (New York: New York Review of Books, 2016).

